نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

• ابراهیم رهبری ¹
• علی خواجوی ²

¹ استادیار گروه حقوق تجارت بین‌الملل و حقوق مالکیت فکری و فضای مجازی، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران

² دانشجوی دکتری حقوق خصوصی، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران

چکیده

این مقاله به تحلیل تطبیقی قانون بازارهای دیجیتال اتحادیه اروپا (DMA) و چارچوب مقرراتی ایران برای سکو‌های دیجیتال می‌پردازد. قانون DMA که در سال ۲۰۲۲ به تصویب رسید از یک رویکرد پیشگیرانه (ex-ante) برای تنظیم‌گری دروازه‌بان‌ها استفاده می‌کند و هدف آن تضمین رقابت‌پذیری و انصاف در بازارهای دیجیتال است. این قانون تعهداتی را بر سکو‌های مسلط تحمیل می‌کند تا از رفتارهای ضد رقابتی جلوگیری کرده و شفافیت را افزایش دهد. در مقابل، مقررات ایران از جمله سیاست‌های شورای عالی فضای مجازی، بیشتر بر حفاظت از مصرف‌کنندگان و حریم خصوصی داده‌ها متمرکز است و فاقد مقررات مشخصی برای تنظیم‌گری دروازه‌بان‌های دیجیتال است. این پژوهش مفاد قانون DMA از جمله الزامات شفافیت و قابلیت تعامل‌پذیری را بررسی کرده و آن را با چارچوب قانونی ایران مقایسه می‌کند. همچنین ارزیابی می‌کند که آیا مقررات فعلی ایران برای مقابله با چالش‌های رقابتی مشابه کافی هستند یا نیاز به اصلاح دارند. این تحلیل نشان می‌دهد که رویکرد پیشگیرانه DMA می‌تواند به‌عنوان الگویی برای بهبود رقابت و انصاف در بخش دیجیتال ایران مورد استفاده قرار گیرد. با بررسی چارچوب‌های تنظیم‌گری، این پژوهش به درک بهتر چگونگی ایجاد محیط‌های رقابتی در فضای دیجیتال کمک می‌کند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

• قانون بازارهای دیجیتال (DMA)
• دروازه‌بانان
• رقابت درون‌سکویی
• رقابت میان‌سکویی
• رقابت فراسکویی

موضوعات

• حقوق خصوصی

عنوان مقاله [English]

Competitive Obligations of Gatekeepers Under the EU Digital Markets Act: Lessons for Iranian Competition Law

نویسندگان [English]

• Ebrahim Rahbari ¹
• Ali Khajavi ²

¹ Assistant Professor, Department of International Trade Law, Intellectual Property Law and Cyberspace, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

² Ph.D Student, Private Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

چکیده [English]

Introduction

Large technology platforms play an unparalleled role in the global digital economy. Under the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA), a company is legally designated as a gatekeeper only if it meets specific quantitative and qualitative statutory criteria—such as annual turnover, size of the user base, and an entrenched market position—rather than merely exhibiting general market dominance. Companies satisfying these thresholds, such as Google, Apple, and Amazon, function as primary intermediaries between business users and end-users. Through mechanisms such as network effects, lock-in effects, economies of scale and scope, and massive data accumulation, these firms have created significant barriers to entry, thereby disrupting competition.
These dynamics have raised global concerns regarding contestability, fairness, and transparency in digital markets. In response, the EU adopted the DMA in 2022, shifting from a traditional ex-post approach to an ex-ante regulatory framework. This Act imposes specific obligations on designated gatekeepers to prevent anti-competitive practices before they occur. In Iran, the relevant legal framework consists of general competition laws—particularly the Law on the Implementation of the General Policies of Article 44 of the Constitution—as well as regulatory instruments issued by the Supreme Council of Cyberspace and the Audio-Visual Media Regulatory Authority (SATRA). The current research aimed to provide a comparative analysis of the DMA and Iran’s legal framework to assess whether the country’s current laws are adequate or structural reforms inspired by the EU model are required.

Literature Review

The current study relied on the theoretical distinction between ex post competition law and ex ante sector‑specific regulation. Traditional competition law often reacts too slowly to the dynamics of digital markets, where tipping points can rapidly lead to monopolies that are difficult to reverse. The exiting literature generally categorizes the challenges posed by gatekeepers into three forms of competition: (1) inter‑platform competition, which refers to competition between different platforms seeking to attract users (e.g., iOS and Android); (2) intra‑platform competition, which concerns competition among business users operating within a single platform (e.g., merchants on Amazon); and (3) cross‑platform competition, where gatekeepers leverage their market power to expand into or influence adjacent markets. In addition, the literature review highlighted that the DMA was introduced because existing antitrust tools—such as Article 102 of the TFEU—were inadequate for addressing structural market failures in which winner‑takes‑all dynamics prevail. The paper also examined Iranian legal doctrine, particularly the Policies and Requirements for Competition Protection and Anti‑Monopoly in Cyberspace Platforms and SATRA’s guidelines, and evaluated how these frameworks would define market dominance and anti‑competitive conduct compared with the more sophisticated and precise concepts set out in the DMA.

Materials and Methods

This research employed a descriptive–analytical and comparative legal methodology. It undertook a detailed textual analysis of the DMA—focusing on Articles 5, 6, and 7 concerning gatekeeper obligations—and compared these provisions with relevant Iranian statutes, including the Law on the Implementation of the General Policies of Article 44 of the Constitution, the Supreme Council of Cyberspace’s policies, and SATRA’s regulations. The study assessed the legal nature of the obligations by distinguishing between self‑executing rules and those requiring further specification. The analysis also examined the definitions of gatekeeper and dominant position, and evaluated the enforcement mechanisms available in both jurisdictions.

Results and Discussion

The comparative analysis yielded several findings regarding the DMA framework. The DMA imposes obligations to ensure contestability and fairness in digital markets, which can be understood according to the type of competition involved. In terms of inter‑platform competition, the DMA prohibits anti‑steering provisions that prevent business users from directing consumers to offers outside the platform. It requires that end users be able to uninstall pre‑installed applications and change default settings, including the possibility of sideloading. These measures are intended to reduce barriers to entry for competing platforms. With respect to intra‑platform competition, the DMA places particular emphasis on prohibiting self‑preferencing under Article 6(5). Gatekeepers that perform a dual role—acting both as a platform host and as a competitor within the platform—are prohibited from ranking their own products or services more favorably than those of third parties. They are also restricted from using non‑public data generated by business users on the platform to compete against them. Finally, regarding cross‑platform competition, the DMA seeks to prevent gatekeepers from leveraging their power into adjacent markets by prohibiting the bundling of core platform services (e.g., identification or payment services) and by restricting the combination of personal data across different services without the user’s explicit consent (i.e., consent bundling).
The Iranian legal framework reflects a more fragmented and less systematic approach. The policies adopted by the Supreme Council of Cyberspace refer to platform service providers rather than defining gatekeepers based on clear quantitative thresholds. Although these policies prohibit restrictive pre‑installed applications and require a degree of transparency in ranking algorithms, they frequently conflate obligations owed to end users with those owed to business users. While they also prohibit exclusivity arrangements and unfair terms, they lack the precise and structured ex ante rigor that characterizes the DMA. Similarly, SATRA’s guidelines introduce the concept of user‑centric gatekeeper media, defined according to market share (40% or more) or user base (more than one million users). These guidelines mandate data access for business users and prohibit discriminatory ranking practices. However, their scope is confined to the audio‑visual media sector, leaving other digital markets outside their regulatory reach. Broadly speaking, there are critical gaps. Unlike the DMA, Iranian regulations do not provide a clear and unified definition of gatekeeper applicable across all digital sectors. The Iranian approach relies predominantly on general competition law concepts—particularly the abuse of dominance—which requires a lengthy proof of fault. By contrast, the DMA’s per se obligations facilitate more streamlined enforcement. Furthermore, Iranian regulations often mix criminal law notions, such as hoarding, with the competition law, thereby diluting its economic focus.

Conclusion

Although Iranian policymakers have recognized the risks posed by digital monopolies—evident in regulatory documents addressing issues such as algorithmic transparency, pre‑installed applications, and data portability—the current framework suffers from structural fragmentation and a lack of legal certainty. The comparative analysis showed that the strength of the DMA lies in its structured system of obligations, which operates across four principal dimensions: (1) obligations toward end users, such as ensuring portability and meaningful choice; (2) obligations toward business users, including fair access and the prohibition of self‑preferencing; (3) obligations toward other platforms (interoperability); and (4) obligations toward regulatory authorities, especially with respect to transparency in mergers and profiling practices.
By contrast, the Iranian legal framework remains largely reactive and lacks a clear designation of gatekeeper that would automatically trigger specific regulatory obligations. As a result, it is recommended that the Iranian legislature could benefit from adopting a regulatory model similar to that of the DMA in order to promote a fair and competitive digital economy. Such an approach would involve establishing clear quantitative and qualitative criteria for identifying gatekeeper platforms, distinguishing more clearly between obligations owed to business users and those owed to end users in order to address the distinct power imbalances in each relationship, and introducing ex ante regulations that prohibit specific anti‑competitive practices (e.g., self‑preferencing) without requiring lengthy market analysis, thereby enabling faster and more effective regulatory intervention.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

• Digital Markets Act (DMA)
• Gatekeepers
• Intra-platform Competition
• Inter-platform Competition
• Extra-platform Competition