نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
استادیار ،گروه حقوق خصوصی دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، ایران، تهران
چکیده
تقسیم‌بندی مراجع قضایی و تعیین نصاب‌های مالی به‌عنوان معیاری برای تعیین صلاحیت نسبی، از بنیادی‌ترین ابزارهای سیاست‌گذاری قضایی درجهت کارآمدسازی نظام دادرسی و تخصیص بهینۀ منابع محسوب می‌شود. این الگو که در نظام‌های رومی–ژرمنی و کامن‌لا سابقه‌ای دیرینه دارد بر «اصل تناسب» میان پیچیدگی دعوا و مرجع رسیدگی استوار بوده و نقش تعیین‌کننده‌ای در تفکیک دعواهای خرد و کلان، تخصیص تخصصی پرونده‌ها و تمرکز دادگاه‌های عالی‌رتبه بر دعواهای مهم‌تر و به‌طور کلی «فرا اصل ادارۀ شایستۀ جریان دادگستری» ایفا می‌کند. رأی وحدت رویۀ شمارۀ ۸۶۵ تاریخ 31 تیر ۱۴۰۴ دیوان‌عالی کشور با پذیرش امکان تقویم خواسته ازسوی خواهان به‌نحوی‌که بر صلاحیت نسبی اثرگذار باشد، مناقشات حقوقی گسترده‌ای درخصوص مبانی و اهداف ایجاد صلاحیت نسبی و تأثیر تقویم خواسته بر صلاحیت برانگیخته است. این رأی ابعاد نظری و عملی متنوعی را مطرح کرده است. این مقاله با روش تحلیلی-انتقادی و رویکرد تاریخی-تطبیقی به این ابعاد می‌پردازد. تحلیل قوانین و مطالعۀ تطبیقی نشان می‌دهد که سابقۀ قانونگذاری کشور بر معیار «بهای واقعی خواسته» برای تشخیص صلاحیت استوار بوده و تقویم قراردادی خواهان به‌ندرت مبنای اختصاصی صلاحیت قرار گرفته است. از زمان قانون تشکیلات قضایی ۱۷۹۰ در فرانسه، صلاحیت نسبی دادگاه صلح و دادگاه بدایت بر پایۀ ارزش واقعی دعوا تعیین شده است و در ایالات متحده نیز معیار «Amount in Controversy» در تعیین صلاحیت دادگاه‌های فدرال همراه با تنوع تابعیت، مبتنی بر ارزیابی واقعی بوده و تقویم خواهان تحت نظارت جدی دادگاه‌ها، قابل اعتراض است. این پژوهش نتیجه می‌گیرد که رأی وحدت رویۀ ۸۶۵ با فلسفه و مبانی صلاحیت نسبی همخوانی ندارد. اصلاح قانون برای تصریح معیار «بهای واقعی خواسته»، پیش‌بینی سازوکار اعتراض به تقویم ازطریق رویۀ قضایی و بازنگری در حدود صلاحیت مراجع پایین براساس ظرفیت تخصصی آن‌ها ضروری است.
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
Plaintiff-Controlled Jurisdiction through Claim Valuation? A Critique of the Iranian Supreme Court's Unification Judgment No. 865 with a Comparative Perspective on French and American Law
نویسنده [English]
- Badie Fathi
Assistant Professor, Department of Private and Economic Law, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]
The division of judicial bodies and the establishment of monetary thresholds as a criterion for determining value-based jurisdiction (ratione valoris) are fundamental tools of judicial policy aimed at enhancing the efficiency of the justice system and ensuring the optimal allocation of resources. This model, with deep roots in both Romano-Germanic (Civil Law) and Common Law systems, is founded on the principle of proportionality between the complexity of a dispute and the adjudicating body. It plays a decisive role in segregating minor from major claims, facilitating specialized case allocation, and enabling higher courts to focus on more significant disputes—all in service of the meta-principle of the proper administration of justice. Unification Judgment No. 865, issued by the Iranian Supreme Court on July 22, 2025 (31 Tir 1404), by affirming the plaintiff’s ability to value a claim in a manner that influences value-based jurisdiction, has ignited significant legal debate regarding the foundational objectives of this jurisdictional framework and the proper effect of claim valuation, raising extensive theoretical and practical implications. This article examines these dimensions using an analytical-critical methodology and a historical-comparative approach. Legislative history and comparative analysis reveal that Iranian law has traditionally relied on the “real value of the claim” to determine jurisdiction, seldom permitting a plaintiff’s unilateral valuation to be the sole basis. This aligns with international practice: in France, since the judicial organization law of 1790, the jurisdiction of the Peace Court (juge de paix) has been predicated on the real value of the dispute. Similarly, in the United States, the “amount in controversy” requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction is subject to a good-faith assessment and can be challenged and scrutinized by the court. This research concludes that Unification Judgment No. 865 is inconsistent with the underlying philosophy of value-based jurisdiction. It advocates for legislative reform to: (1) explicitly codify the “real value of the claim” as the controlling standard; (2) establish a clear procedural mechanism, through judicial precedent, for challenging claim valuations; and (3) revise the jurisdictional limits of lower courts based on their specialized capacity.
The Iranian Supreme Court’s Unification Judgment No. 865 has instigated extensive legal controversies by establishing that a plaintiff’s unilateral valuation of the claim (taqvim-e khasteh) directly determines subject-matter jurisdiction (ratione valoris) between the Peace Court (a court of limited jurisdiction) and higher civil tribunals, namely the General Civil and Family Courts. An examination of Iran’s legislative history since the adoption of its first code of civil procedure in 1911 (see, e.g., Law on the Principles of Court Organization and Officials’ Employment of 1911), combined with a comparative analysis of the French and American legal systems, reveals that the foundational philosophy of pecuniary jurisdiction has consistently been predicated on the objective or real value of a claim, rather than the plaintiff’s subjective assessment.
In France, a principle established since the Judiciary Act of 1790 and upheld in its modern Code of Judicial Organization (Code de l’organisation judiciaire), and similarly in the United States through the “Amount in Controversy” doctrine, the valuation of a claim is subject to judicial scrutiny and may be challenged and amended (see, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 1938). From the author’s perspective, Unification Judgment No. 865 is therefore not only incongruous with fundamental principles of procedural justice and the teleological purpose of subject-matter jurisdiction, but it also portends deleterious organizational, social, and legal ramifications.
This judgment effectively neutralizes the function of pecuniary jurisdiction as a critical managerial and organizational instrument for the efficient allocation of judicial resources, the docketing and segregation of minor versus major disputes, and the cultivation of judicial specialization and expertise. The establishment of jurisdictional monetary thresholds ought to be calibrated to the “institutional capacity” of each judicial tier, thereby ensuring that legally complex cases, irrespective of their nominal monetary value, are adjudicated by tribunals possessing the requisite competence and specialized knowledge.
Furthermore, the ruling contravenes several core legal principles, including the right of access to a competent and appropriate judicial forum, the principles of good governance, proportionality in civil procedure, and the duty of candor in litigation. In essence, by devolving the determination of jurisdiction to the arbitrary volition of an individual litigant, Judgment No. 865 erodes the juridico-administrative order of the judiciary. To preserve procedural efficiency and safeguard public trust, its legislative reversal or amendment is an exigent necessity. In the interim, judicial practice could mitigate the judgment’s impact by permitting jurisdictional challenges to the plaintiff’s stated value of the claim.
This research thus concludes that Unification Judgment No. 865 is fundamentally at variance with the philosophy and doctrinal underpinnings of subject-matter jurisdiction (ratione valoris). It is imperative that legislative reform be undertaken to: (1) explicitly codify the “real value” of the claim as the objective jurisdictional criterion, (2) institute a procedural mechanism for challenging a plaintiff’s valuation, and (3) recalibrate the jurisdictional mandates of lower courts in alignment with their specialized capacities.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
- Access to Justice
- Principle of Proportionality
- Proper Administration of Justice
- Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (ratione valoris)
- Peace Court
- Valuation of the Claim
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