نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشیار گروه حقوق خصوصی، دانشکدۀ حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران.
2 دانشیار گروه حقوق خصوصی و اقتصادی، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران.
3 دانشجوی دکتری حقوق خصوصی، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران
چکیده
اگرچه استنباط حکم حقوقی امکان یا عدم‌امکان حمایت از رنگ‌ها به‌عنوان علامت تجاری از قوانین‌ومقرّرات برای حقوق‌دانان امری ساده به‌نظر می‌رسد، لیکن از منظر علم اقتصاد این موضوع با تردیدهای جدّی روبه‌رو است. در این پژوهش، کارآیی یا عدم‌کارآیی حمایت از رنگ‌ها به‌عنوان علامت تجاری از دیدگاه تحلیل اقتصادی حقوق مورد بررسی قرار گرفته است. «عدم تمایزبخشی»، «کمبود» و «کاربردی بودنِ» رنگ‌ها از موانع و چالش‌های حمایت از رنگ‌ها به‌عنوان علامت تجاری به‌شمار می‌روند که مبنای اقتصادی آن‌ها حفاظت از رقابت آزاد در بازار است. نتایج این پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که اگر رنگ‌ها از طریق ثبت به‌عنوان علامت تجاری به انحصار اشخاص درآیند، در بسیاری از موارد ممکن است به صاحب علامت «قدرت بازاری» اعطا کنند، چراکه بسیاری از رنگ‌ها به‌طور طبیعی سهم بازار بالایی دارند و حتّی باعث کاهش انعطاف‌پذیری میزان تقاضای مصرف‌کنندگان دربرابر تغییرات قیمت می‌شوند. بر همین اساس، حمایت از رنگ‌ها به‌عنوان علامت تجاری از یک‌سو باعث تضییق رقابت و افزایش قیمت‌ها در بازار می‌شود و ازسوی دیگر، انتخاب‌های مصرف‌کنندگان را محدود می‌کند. در اغلب موارد حمایت از رنگ‌ها به‌عنوان علامت تجاری نه‌تنها به «کاهش هزینه‌های مبادلاتی» بر اثر «کاهش هزینه‌های جست‌وجو» از طریق «تخصیص بهینۀ منابع» منجر نمی‌شود، بلکه کارآیی لازم را نیز ندارد.
کلیدواژه‌ها
عنوان مقاله [English]
Economic Analysis of Protecting Colors as Trademarks: With a Glance at Iranian and U.S. Law
نویسندگان [English]
- Mirghasem Jafarzadeh 1
- Abbas Toosi 2
- Amir Hosein Shah Mohammadi 3
1 Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.
2 Associate Professor, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran.
3 Ph.D. Student in Private Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran.
چکیده [English]
While legal scholars may find it straightforward to determine the permissibility of protecting colors as trademarks based on existing laws and regulations, from an economic perspective, this matter is subject to significant uncertainties. This study investigates the efficiency or inefficiency of protecting colors as trademarks from the perspective of the economic analysis of law. The "lack of distinctiveness", "depletion," and "functionality" of colors are identified as key obstacles and challenges to their protection as trademarks, with their economic rationale grounded in safeguarding free market competition.
The protection of colors as trademarks poses significant challenges and concerns in the realms of Law and Economics, as the monopolization of colors is seriously questioned due to their inherent limitations and characteristics as Public Goods. From the perspective of producers, establishing a distinct color identity constitutes a competitive advantage and a valuable asset, which can incentivize investment in quality and advertising, as consumers recognize and associate the product with that specific color. On the other hand, monopolizing colors as trademarks may lead to restrictions on consumer choice. The rent derived from such monopolization is inconsistent with the economic principles of intellectual property law. The significance of the economic analysis of protecting colors as trademarks lies in the necessity for the trademark legal system to balance the interests of trademark owners on one hand and the public interest of the market on the other.
The economic analysis method of this article is grounded in the theoretical framework of Neoclassical Economics, employing microeconomic indicators such as price elasticity of demand and market share to evaluate the economic impacts of protecting colors as trademarks on search costs, competition, and innovation. The rationale for selecting this method lies in its ability to provide a robust theoretical framework for analyzing the efficiency and welfare implications of legal regulations, ultimately determining whether the protection of colors as trademarks generally benefits consumers and the market or not.
This research, emphasizing the importance of interdisciplinary studies in Law and Economics and utilizing microeconomic tools, examines legal issues in the field of intellectual property. From this perspective, it constitutes an innovation in light of the scarcity of economic analysis within Iran's intellectual property law literature. The added value of this study not only deepens legal scholars' understanding of how economic principles influence legal frameworks but also establishes new standards for future research in this significant yet underexplored domain. At the time of writing this article, the executive regulation pertaining to Article 149 of the Industrial Property Protection Act of 2024 has not yet been drafted or adopted, providing a valuable opportunity for the findings and recommendations of this research to influence the formulation of the new regulation.
In the first section of this research, the legal frameworks and judicial practices of Iran and the United States are examined to determine whether colors can be protected as trademarks, addressing the question: What is the current legal stance of these two countries on this issue? After clarifying the legal positions of both jurisdictions and establishing a foundation for economic analysis, the study explores the economic challenges of protecting colors as trademarks, answering the question: What obstacles arise when protecting colors as trademarks, and how do these obstacles economically impact the market? In the second section, using microeconomic tools, the research investigates: Does protecting colors as trademarks grant market power to the trademark owner, and what are the economic effects of this power? Finally, the study addresses the core question: Is protecting colors as trademarks economically efficient? The data for this research were collected through library-based methods and analyzed using a descriptive-analytical approach.
The findings of this study indicate that if colors are monopolized through trademark registration, in many cases, they may confer "market power" to the trademark owner, as many colors naturally command a significant market share and may even reduce the elasticity of consumer demand in response to price changes. Consequently, protecting colors as trademarks restricts competition and raises market prices on the one hand, while limiting consumer choices on the other. In most cases, protecting colors as trademarks not only fails to reduce transaction costs through lower search costs via optimal resource allocation, but also lacks the requisite efficiency.
Since protecting colors as trademarks is generally inefficient, it is proposed that the executive regulation concerning Article 149 of the Industrial Property Protection Act of 2024, which has not yet been drafted or adopted, clearly and explicitly define the Trademark Registration Office's stance on Color Trademarks. Unlike the previous regulation (approved in 2008), which implicitly accepted the protection of colors in Articles 108 and 120, the new regulation should prohibit the protection of colors alone or, at the very least, make their registration and protection conditional upon demonstrating acquired distinctiveness in the market and proving their non-functionality.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
- Economic Analysis of Law
- Color Trademark
- Market Power
- Price Elasticity of Demand
- Market Share
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