Private Law Research

Abstract 1. Introduction The designation of the Civil Registration Organization as the official authority for issuing certificates of inheritance, as stipulated in Paragraph (e) of Article 113 of the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan Act of the Islamic Republic of Iran, represents one of the most significant institutional reforms in recent legislative cycles. This measure, supported by the enactment of a detailed 23-article executive bylaw, was initially justified by the legislature as a step toward administrative efficiency, reducing judicial workload, and facilitating citizens’ access to inheritance-related documentation. However, the legal framework underpinning this reform faces considerable challenges. The present study seeks to identify and analyze these challenges while assessing whether the delegation of such authority to a non-judicial body is consistent with existing legal principles and statutory provisions. 2. Literature Review Although the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan Act entered into force in 2024 and the executive bylaw of Paragraph (e) of Article 113 was adopted in 2025, legal scholarship has thus far made no serious attempt to examine the aforementioned questions and challenges. This is despite the fact that the nature of these legal ambiguities and procedural challenges is such that they will inevitably confront judicial practice sooner or later. Accordingly, the necessity of addressing and analyzing these issues is self-evident. 3. Research Methodology Employing a descriptive–analytical research method, this paper examines the relevant legal sources, laws and regulations governing certificates of inheritance in Iran. The method involves a comparative reading of the Seventh Development Plan’s provisions against foundational laws—particularly the Act on Mandatory Official Registration of Immovable Properties Transactions—and the previous laws and regulations governing non-contentious matters, thereby seeking to identify an appropriate response to the aforementioned challenges. 4. Results and Discussion The legal implication of Subsection (e) of Article 113 and Paragraph 2 of Article 11 of its implementing bylaw indicates the necessity of including wills in certificates of inheritance. However, this requirement currently applies only to official wills, while holographic and secret wills require judicial validation before being included. Where such a will concerns immovable property and is executed under “ordinary circumstances,” this arrangement appears inconsistent with Article 1 of the Act on the Compulsory Registration of Official Transactions Concerning Immovable Property, indicating that the legislature failed to adequately consider the registration regime. Paragraph 3 of Article 11, by requiring the Civil Registration Organization to specify the authority competent to review objections and the manner in which the certificate becomes final, remedies a deficiency previously found in judicial practice. Nevertheless, unlike Note 3 to Article 339 of the Civil Procedure Code, it fails to provide that the Organization’s designation is non-binding. The ten-day period prescribed by Subsection (e) of Article 113 and Article 12 for objecting to a certificate is also inconsistent with Articles 362 and 369 of the Law on Non-Contentious Matters, which imposed no time limit on objections to court-issued certificates. Expiry of this period may compel interested persons to establish kinship judicially before obtaining amendment of the certificate. Furthermore, Subsection (e) of Article 113 and Articles 12 and 13 designate the Dispute Resolution Board of the Civil Registration
Organization, which lacks a judicial officer, as the authority competent to review objections, despite the legal expertise required to resolve complex inheritance issues. The use of the term “judgment” for the Board’s decision is also questionable, particularly since Article 4 of the Civil Registration Act characterizes its determinations as “decisions.” The silence of Subsection (e) and Article 13 concerning the authority competent to hear objections to the Board’s decision, coupled with their reference only to a “competent” court, may create jurisdictional conflicts between general civil courts and Peace Courts. Likewise, the absence of any provision concerning appeal has enabled the implementing bylaw to exceed interpretation and enter the legislative sphere by declaring first-instance judgments final. A teleological interpretation, consistent with the latest legislative intent, supports the conclusion that jurisdiction lies with the Peace Court and that its judgment may, within the limits of the Civil Procedure Code, be challenged through ordinary and extraordinary remedies, except cassation. This applies whether the matter reaches the Peace Court through an objection to the Board’s decision or directly through an objection to the Organization’s decision. Finally, although Article 18 addresses the effect of final judicial judgments concerning kinship on certificates of inheritance, it fails to address the converse situation in which the certificate itself has preceded or resulted in a final judgment. Read with Articles 8 and 426 of the Civil Procedure Code, this omission creates uncertainty as to which judgment prevails. In such circumstances, Article 477 of the Criminal Procedure Code may provide the only mechanism for
depriving a certificate-related judgment, wholly or partially, of legal effect where it is manifestly contrary to Sharia. 5. Conclusion The findings of this research demonstrate that a lack of adequate familiarity on the part of the authorities responsible for adopting the act the the afformentioned executive bylaw with the relevant legal principles and laws and regulations governing certificates of inheritence—such as the Act on Mandatory Official Registration of Immovable Properties Transactions—has resulted in significant conflicts among the applicable laws. Misapplication of legal terminology (e.g., referring to the decisions of the Civil Registration Organization’s Dispute Resolution Board as “rulings”) and the inappropriate conferral of jurisdiction on this non-judicial Board, together with the imposition of a time limit for filing objections, further illustrate these deficiencies. In addition, the silence of Paragraph (e) of the aforementioned Article 113 on numerous essential aspects has sometimes led the executive bylaw to exceed its explanatory function and encroach upon the legislature’s domain by extending the scope of the Act beyond its original intent. In certain instances, this legislative silence is repeated in the bylaw itself, leaving unresolved issues such as the identification of the competent court to hear objections against the Board’s decisions and the possibility of subsequent appeals to appellate and supreme courts.

Abstract 1. Introduction The global aviation sector depends on a an effective legal infrastructure for aircraft financing to attract investment and manage credit risk. International instruments—particularly the Geneva Convention (1948) and the Cape Town Convention (2001)—have established new frameworks for accessory real rights, including the direct enforcement of rights and asset-based financing. In contrast, the Iranian legal system recognizes the traditional mechanism of judicial enforcement of accessory rights, which mandates under Article 779 of the Civil Code that enforcement requires judicial intervention. This structure imposes significant economic costs on Iranian airlines, including higher interest rates and limited access to international capital markets. Research Questions 1. Main Research Question: Are accessory real rights (ḥuqūq ‘ayniyya tabi‘iyya), as provided for under the Geneva Convention (1948) and the Cape Town Convention (2001), compatible with the principles of Imamiyyah jurisprudence and the Iranian legal system, and can they be implemented within Iran’s current legal framework? 2. Subsidiary Research Questions: 1. What capacities do Iran’s new financing laws provide for harmonization? 2. What are the economic effects of accession to each of these international conventions? 3. What strategies can be adopted to harmonize Iranian law with these international instruments? 2. Literature Review Existing scholarship on aircraft financing in Iran is fragmented and often examines civil law and Imamiyyah jurisprudence only to a limited extent. 1-2. Domestic Legal Scholarship Iranian legal scholars have extensively analyzed Article 779 of the Civil Code and its application to financing contracts. 1-1-2. Civil Law Interpretations Scholars such as Dr. Katouzian and Dr. Shahidi emphasize the judicial nature of security enforcement within a prescribed procedure. 2-1-2. Recent Legislative Developments Studies by Eshraghi Arani (2015, 2016) and Jafari (2020) examine the capacity of the Financial Facilitation Laws of 2015–2023 to overcome traditional barriers, although they do not systematically integrate this legislation into international frameworks. 2-2. Jurisprudential Approaches Classical Imamiyyah sources, including Jawāhir al-Kalām (Najafi) and Tahrīr al-Wasīlah (Imam Khomeini), have rarely been used in contemporary discussions to address concepts such as commercial self-help, despite containing flexible principles such as awfū bi-l-ʿuqūd (fulfillment of contracts) and lā ḍarar (no harm). 3-2. International Comparative Studies International literature (e.g., Goode, 2022; IATA, 2022) underscores the economic impact of the Cape Town Convention. However, the general neglect of Imamiyyah jurisprudence has limited the development of legal dialogue. 3. Methodology This research employs a descriptive-analytical and comparative method. Its primary sources include: - Jurisprudential texts (Tahrīr al-Wasīlah, Jawāhir al-Kalām); - Iranian legislation (Civil Code, Financial Facilitation Laws of 2015 and 2023, Law on Removal of Obstacles to Production); - International instruments (Geneva Convention of 1948, Cape Town Convention of 2001); - Case law from international tribunals (e.g., AerCap Holdings N.V. v. Iran Air).
The doctrinal analysis is supplimented by economic data on financing costs and an evaluation of recent reforms in Iran. 4. Results and Discussion The study finds that Imamiyyah jurisprudence does not contain a substantive prohibition on the self-help enforcement of security interests. Rather, principles such as taslīṭ (dominion over property) and ‘urf (commercial custom) support contractual autonomy. The main structural obstacles in Iranian statutory law include: - The requirement of judicial enforcement under Article 779 of the Civil Code; - The invalidity of irrevocable powers of attorney under Article 19 of the Elimination Obstacles to Production Law; - The absence of a centralized and internationally recognized aircraft registry.

However, the recent financing legislation marks a significant shift by establishing a unified collateral registry, thereby laying the institutional groundwork for legal harmonization. The economic cost of non-accession is substantial: Iranian airlines face financing costs that are 10–15% higher than those faced by the signitoreis of the Cape Town Convention. The paper argues that the jurisprudential conflict can be resolved through arguments based on public interest and an expansive interpretation of ‘urf in commercial contexts. 5. Conclusion Full accession to the Cape Town Convention is not merely a legal reform but an economic imperative. The study proposes a “gradual harmonization” model, which includes: (1) Making reservations on matters concerning Islamic jurisprudential rules;
(2) Amending the Civil Code to permit the direct enforcement of security interests in aircrafts; (3) Establishing a national aircraft registry that is compatible with the International Registry; (4) Developing judicial expertise in transnational secured transactions.
This pathway enables Iran to acheive financial integration without compromising its jurisprudential foundations.

Abstract 1. Introduction Artificial intelligence (AI) has now permeated nearly all aspects of human life. Looking toward the future, it can be said that its scope of influence will expand to such an extent that it may fully replace many human functions. Despite the rapid expansion and continuous improvement of AI technologies across various sectors, there remains a significant gap in addressing the legal liability challenges arising from the operation of these technologies. This article aims to examine the concept of “AI insurance” as a potential solution for mitigating liabilities associated with artificial intelligence—an approach that simultaneously promotes innovation and safety. The primary objective is to establish a framework that not only encourages continuous development but also proactively prevents potential harm and, in the event of damage, ensures full compensation. Research Questions 1. Is it possible to insure AI systems? 2. What are the main obstacles to insuring AI systems? 3. How can practical solutions overcome these obstacles? 2. Literature Review The risks arising from artificial intelligence necessitate the development of new policies or the establishment of new insurance infrastructures. None of these proposals have yet received full approval from the legal and insurance communities, and insurance policies covering this technology remain in an experimental phase. In 1996, Karnow proposed one of the earliest models for AI insurance. According to this proposal, only registered AI systems would be covered by insurance, and programmers would be required to obtain certification and pay premiums for their AI systems prior to distribution and sale. Consequently, manufacturers would be obligated to purchase liability insurance policies to cover damages to third-parties caused by AI systems. A more recent proposal concerns the use of AI in the medical field. This approach argues that a well-designed AI liability insurance scheme could reduce risks and uncertainties for stakeholders, thereby safeguarding the interests of patients, physicians, and hospitals. Numerous proposals have also been presented regarding mandatory insurance for autonomous vehicles. However, Iranian law has not yet specifically addressed the issue of insuring AI systems. Therefore, this research examines the impact of the insurance industry on artificial intelligence and the feasibility of providing insurance coverage for damages resulting from AI operations. Given that scholars and legislators have not yet provided a satisfactory solution to the issue of liability arising from AI, this study explores the role of insurance in controlling and mitigating damages caused by artificial intelligence. 3. Research Methodology This study employs a descriptive-analytical method to examine the insurability of AI systems and the impact of the insurance industry on artificial intelligence given the existing infrastructure. The article proposes solutions to overcome the obstacles faced by the insurance industry in insuring AI systems, with the aim of encouraging development and innovation, proactively preventing potential harm, and ensuring full compensation in the event of injury or damage. 4. Results and Discussion The insurance industry is currently undergoing a necessary transformation to align itself with disruptive technologies. This transformation requires considerable time and effort to design insurance policies tailored to emerging risks. Such a complex shift is accompanied by numerous challenges and may encounter multiple obstacles that create uncertainty regarding its effectiveness. Nevertheless, the growing demand for efficient insurance policies—particularly in the field of artificial intelligence—is likely to motivate insurers and policyholders to collaboratively seek solutions tailored to these specific risks. Insurers are naturally inclined to develop coverage that promises profitability; therefore, they will likely adopt a cautious approach toward new AI-related insurance products, especially given the unpredictable nature of potential damages resulting from AI operations. Determining accurate premiums remains a major challenge, as assessing risks associated with AI technologies involves inherent uncertainties. Insurers must adopt strategic approaches to distribute these risks effectively. In this context, concepts such as “insurance pools” become significant, as they enable collective agreements among insurers to share risks arising from emerging technologies and contribute to market stabilization. One of the key factors influencing the adoption of insurance policies for AI systems is the question of who exercises primary control over the technology. Depending on the circumstances and the type of system, the responsibility for obtaining insurance may fall on manufacturers or users. A common concern is that many individuals and businesses may delay purchasing insurance coverage until it becomes a legal requirement. The challenges of AI insurance extend beyond the inherent difficulties of the insurance industry itself. These challenges include the unpredictable and often opaque nature of AI decision-making, as well as complex liability issues that may hinder the development of coherent insurance frameworks. The multilayered and intricate characteristics of AI have generated numerous disputes and difficulties in efforts to formulate effective liability solutions. Although the insurance industry has not yet fully grasped the implications of artificial intelligence, there is growing awareness that traditional insurance policies require modification and adaptation to effectively address emerging technological advancements. This necessity is particularly evident in the Iranian insurance market, where even older challenges—such as cybersecurity-related issues—have not yet been fully resolved. Given the tangible consumer demand for AI-based insurance and the rapid pace of AI development, the need for the insurance industry to keep pace with these changes is increasingly apparent. Individuals and businesses seek deterrence and reassurance; insurance provides a sense of security and assures customers that they will be protected against unforeseen threats. When designing AI-related insurance products, careful attention must be paid to the specific characteristics of AI systems, the nature of their operations, and the associated risks. Each policy must be crafted with great precision and tailored to the unique needs of each client. 5. Conclusion At first glance, the function of insurance may be perceived merely as a tool for compensating losses and reducing risk for the policyholder. However, its deeper impact can serve as an incentive for manufacturers to actively pursue risk-prevention and loss-mitigation strategies. In this way, insurance can play a regulatory role—one that, while providing necessary security, also creates a supportive environment for sustained innovation. Despite the many challenges ahead, the insurance industry possesses the capacity to overcome these obstacles, particularly if supported by influential institutions. Consequently, the role of policymakers and regulatory authorities is crucial. Supervisory bodies—whether through legislation or by acting as reinsurers—can play a significant role in establishing the necessary infrastructure and incentives to support the development of insurance products aligned with the AI ecosystem.

Abstract Introduction In the civil litigation process, filing a principal claim is frequently accompanied by a series of ancillary financial and non-financial demands and consequences, recognized in legal literature as “ancillary claims.” These ancillary components—prominent examples of which include litigation costs, attorney’s fees, judgment execution expenses, and damages for late payment—appear ostensibly secondary and dependent on the principal action; however, in practice, they constitute a substantial portion of judicial disputes and the concerns of the litigants. Despite the fundamental importance of this subject, Iranian procedural laws, particularly the Civil Procedure Code, lack an integrated systematization and a comprehensive, exclusive definition of the concept, scope, and rules governing ancillary claims. The divergence of opinions in judicial practice, the silence or ambiguity of the legislator in provisions such as Articles 331, 362, 369, 519, and 522 of the Iranian Civil Procedure Code of 2000, as well as the ambiguity in the precise distinction between the principal claim and ancillary demands, have generated numerous interpretative challenges within the courts. Therefore, elucidating the legal nature of this institution and examining the application of procedural rules to it is an undeniable necessity. 2. Objective The primary objective of this research is to accurately and systematically delineate the conceptual boundaries of “ancillary claims” within civil procedure. This study seeks to identify and categorize various types of ancillary claims, enumerate their prominent instances, and determine the legal regime governing these ancillary demands. Furthermore, resolving existing legal ambiguities, addressing the practical challenges faced by judges, and establishing a uniform practice regarding issues such as the jurisdiction of courts, appealability, and the possibility of pursuing ancillary claims independently are among the other key objectives of this research. 3. Methodology This research employs a descriptive-analytical method, relying on library and documentary studies. In this regard, while inductively examining the articles of the Civil Procedure Code and analyzing the theoretical foundations of legal doctrine, the judicial practice of Iranian courts has been examined. 4. Discussion and Results The research findings indicate that ancillary claims can be divided into two major categories based on their degree of dependence on the principal claim: First, “non-independent” or strictly dependent ancillary claims, such as litigation costs, attorney’s fees, and execution expenses, whose existence and relevance hinge upon the existence and proof of the principal claim. Second, ancillary claims possessing “relative independence,” the most conspicuous example being damages for late payment; this category of ancillary claims, although rooted in a principal obligation, may be brought independently under specific circumstances. From the perspective of jurisdictional rules, the present study emphasizes the principle that “the accessory follows the principal” (accessorium sequitur principale). Accordingly, a court that possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate the principal claim shall possess subject matter and territorial jurisdiction to hear its ancillary claims as well. This rule has been acknowledged in judicial practice (such as binding precedent decision No. 60 of the Supreme Court of Iran concerning the right to business and goodwill as an ancillary consequence of an eviction claim). Nevertheless, regarding the claim for damages for late payment of labor-related debts, disagreements existed concerning the jurisdiction of the relevant authorities, which ultimately culminated in the binding precedent decision No. 757 (dated 2017/04/18) of the General Assembly of the Supreme Court. According to this decision, while adjudicating the principal claim falls under the jurisdiction of the labor authorities, adjudicating claims for damages for late payment arising from those debts is deemed within the jurisdiction of the civil court—a decision that is open to criticism in terms of efficiency and desirability. In terms of procedural rules, one of the most significant conclusions of the research is that ancillary claims constitute an exception to the “two-tier adjudication” principle. Unlike the principal claim, ancillary claims can be initially raised at the appellate stage; if the court of first instance has neglected to address them, the appellate court is authorized to independently and directly adjudicate them. Moreover, addressing challenges such as “ancillary claims upon ancillary claims” (which are generally rejected based on the rule against damages on damages, yet remain a subject of doctrinal dispute) and the possibility of granting interim relief and securing the subject matter of the claim for ancillary claims are among the other key discussions in this section. Additionally, concerning the litigation costs of ancillary claims, it was determined that if included in the principal petition, no separate stamp fee cancellation is required; however, filing an independent action for them requires the payment of a separate fee. 5. Innovation The principal innovation of this article lies in compiling, refining, and systematizing the scattered rules governing ancillary claims within a coherent legal framework. The examination of novel usses such as “ancillary claims upon ancillary claims” and critically assessing the possibility of independently filing these actions, alongside utilizing a comparative approach with the French Code of Civil Procedure to justify the legal logic of court jurisdiction over ancillary costs, constitutes the added value that this research contributes to the literature on Iranian procedural law. 6. Conclusion Ultimately, the research concludes that despite the lack of an explicit definition by the legislator, the concept and rules governing ancillary claims can be inferred from the structure and spirit of the Civil Procedure Code. Ancillary claims, notwithstanding their dependent nature, are subject to a specific legal regime regarding procedural rules (such as the possibility of raising them at the appellate stage, abatement of the action, settlement, and appealability) which, in some instances, fundamentally differs from that governing the principal claim. Acknowledging relative independence for certain instances of ancillary claims and recognizing exceptions to general procedural principles (such as the two-tier adjudication principle) demonstrate the legal system’s flexibility in ensuring justice and fully compensating the aggrieved party. Nonetheless, to prevent judicial inconsistency and guarantee legal certainty, it is imperative that the legislator, in future amendments to the Civil Procedure Code, provides a clear definition of ancillary claims and explicitly and definitively codifies the provisions related to jurisdiction over them and the possiblity of filing them independently.

Abstract 1. Introduction This study examines the legal implications of a major legislative development in Iran’s upstream oil and gas sector introduced by Article 44(a) of the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan Act. Historically, following the Second Petroleum Law, Iran relied on service-type contracts for field development. After the Islamic Revolution and a prolonged halt in upstream activities, buy-back contracts were adopted in 1995 as a specific form of service contracts. Despite their widespread use, buy-back contracts faced serious limitations, including the separation of exploration and development, absence of investor participation in production, rigid cost ceilings and repayment limits, inability to adapt work programs to actual reservoir behavior, restriction to discovered fields, lengthy decision-making, and lack of flexibility toward global market conditions. To address these shortcomings, a reform committee was established in 2013, leading to the adoption of the Iran Petroleum Contract (IPC). However, after nearly nine years and the conclusion of eleven contracts, IPCs failed to achieve the objectives emphasized by policymakers, particularly in developing joint oil and gas fields. Consequently, the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan Act explicitly authorized, for the first time, the use of Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) in joint fields. This authorization, issued without detailed implementing provisions, has generated fundamental legal ambiguities regarding the legal nature of PSCs, legislative intent, restriction to joint fields, compatibility with Articles 77 and 139 of the Constitution, the meaning of the clause “without transfer of ownership,” and the framework for drafting contractual terms. This research aims to analyze this authorization from a legal perspective and clarify these ambiguities. 2. Literature Review Recent domestic studies identify joint field development as a strategic priority for Iran’s economic growth and energy security. Policy documents, including the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan, stress the need to increase production and adopt production sharing arrangements. Scholars argue that contractual models must be adaptable to changing economic and political conditions and that precise contract design and effective supervision are essential to protect economic interests and mitigate financial and operational risks. Domestic legal and economic research emphasizes contractual flexibility as a means of reducing conflicts of interest and enhancing efficiency. Comparative analyses generally conclude that PSCs outperform buy-back contracts in terms of risk allocation, economic returns, and compatibility with Iran’s legal system. These studies highlight that PSCs enable a more balanced distribution of risks and incentives between the host state and investors. International literature recognizes PSCs as one of the most effective frameworks for upstream development. Studies underline the importance of strong legal regimes, contractual transparency, and periodic revision. Empirical research shows that the performance of PSCs depends on institutional, economic, and technical factors, with flexibility and technology transfer playing key roles. Despite political and institutional risks, PSCs remain attractive to international oil companies. The experience of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is frequently cited as evidence of the effectiveness of PSCs in attracting investment, increasing production, and maintaining state ownership, particularly in joint fields. Overall, prior research has focused mainly on demonstrating the advantages of PSCs. With the recent explicit authorization in Iran, the research gap has shifted from justifying PSCs to clarifying their legal nature and constitutional implications. This study addresses this gap. 3. Methodology This research adopts a mixed, two-stage approach combining doctrinal legal analysis with an empirical Delphi method. In the first stage, qualitative legal content analysis was conducted on Article 44(a) of the Seventh Development Plan Act and related legal sources, including constitutional provisions, statutes, by-laws, and high-level policy instruments. The analysis focused on identifying and interpreting the key elements of the authorization: the concept of PSCs, legislative objectives, applicable constitutional constraints, the meaning of “without transfer of ownership,” and the rationale for limiting the authorization to joint fields. This stage provided the theoretical framework of the study. In the second stage, given the novelty of the authorization and the absence of established practice, the Delphi method was employed to identify and prioritize implementation challenges. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with twelve purposively selected experts with experience in upstream contract drafting and regulatory design. The data were analyzed thematically to extract legal, institutional, and structural challenges. These challenges were then converted into a structured questionnaire and reassessed by the same panel using a five-point Likert scale. The results were statistically analyzed to rank the challenges. 4. Results and Discussion The legal analysis shows that the PSC envisaged in Article 44(a) has an obligational and contractual nature based on an obligation to achieve a result rather than a transfer of property rights. The investor’s share of production constitutes a contractual entitlement arising after extraction and does not imply ownership over hydrocarbons in situ. This interpretation is consistent with the clause “without transfer of ownership” and with the principles governing natural resources in Iran’s legal system. Regarding constitutional constraints, the findings indicate that PSCs concluded by the National Iranian Oil Company within commercial relations do not, in principle, fall under Article 77 of the Constitution, which requires parliamentary approval for international treaties and agreements. Instead, they are treated as commercial contracts of a state-owned enterprise. Article 139 becomes relevant mainly in relation to dispute settlement, particularly the inclusion of arbitration clauses involving public and state property. The Delphi findings reveal that although domestic and international legal challenges are significant, institutional and structural challenges exert the greatest impact on implementation. These include weaknesses in governance, fragmented decision-making, lack of supplementary regulations, and limited administrative capacity. The analysis also indicates divergent priorities between the contracting parties: the host state emphasizes domestic legal certainty and sovereignty-related risks, whereas investors stress implementation constraints, contractual flexibility, and protection under international investment law. These results suggest that legal authorization alone is insufficient. Effective implementation of PSCs requires parallel improvements in institutional capacity, regulatory clarity, and adaptive contractual mechanisms to balance long-term field productivity with risk management for both parties. 5. Conclusion I This study concludes that the authorization of PSCs in joint oil and gas fields under Article 44(a) of the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan Act marks a pivotal shift in Iran’s upstream contractual regime. Contrary to common assumptions, this authorization does not inherently conflict with Iran’s constitutional and statutory framework and can, if properly interpreted, address the inefficiencies of prior service-type contracts in joint field development. The main challenges lie not in the legality of PSCs as such, but in contract drafting, interpretation of statutory clauses, design of dispute resolution mechanisms, and the absence of coherent supplementary regulations. Moreover, the predominance of institutional and structural challenges highlights the need for reforms in governance and policy implementation alongside legal clarification. Despite limitations arising from the novelty of the authorization and lack of practical experience, this research provides a foundational legal analysis to guide policymakers and contract designers in developing a localized PSC model aligned with Iran’s legal system and strategic objectives.

Abstract 1. Introduction The Golden Rule of ethics, which states: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you," because of its two fundamental elements of rational consistency and empathy arising from imagination and role reversal, has the potential to establish order and justice in human relations. Therefore, it can play a role in a legal system whose ultimate goal is to ensure order and justice. On the other hand, given the deep and extensive normative connections and shared goals between the legal system and the ethical system, the question arises: what is the role and position of the Golden Rule in the legal system? How can this rule be implemented in the legal system? And what are the effects of its implementation in the legal system? 2. Literature Review The only article that has examined from a legal perspective the Golden Rule is Neil Duxbury's «Golden Rule Argument, Moral and Legal Judgment» published in 2009. In this article, the Golden Rule is described as a principle of fairness, and various forms of Golden Rule arguments in criminal cases and issues such as euthanasia and abortion are examined. However, there is no record of a legal review of this rule in the Iranian legal system. Therefore, this study aims to clarify the role and position of the Golden Rule within the legal system by examining its characteristics and comparing them with the features of the Iranian legal system. 3. Methodology This research adopts a qualitative approach. Its sources have been gathered through a library method, and the research is organized into three parts based on a comparative analysis of reputable books and top-tier articles. In the first part, to examine the interaction of the Golden Rule with the legal system, the characteristics of this rule compatibale with the legal system are first examined. Then, considering that the Golden Rule is one of the fundamental ethical principles, the types of interactions between the ethical system and the legal system are examined, and finally, the relationship between the Golden Rule and the evolution of natural law is discussed. In the second part, based on the interaction of the Golden Rule with the legal system, its role and position as a general legal principle are examined, and for this purpose, while defining the general legal principle, its characteristics are compared with the Golden Rule, and its position as a general legal principle in the legal system is explained. In the third part, the effects of applying the Golden Rule as a general legal principle in the form of individualizing punishment principle and the principle of reasonableness in modern contract law are examined. 4. Results and Discussion The Golden Rule is an ethical principle with a social dimension. Its application affects not only an individual's life but also the lives of others and regulates social relations within a community. Its normative dimension, similar to a legal system, involves preventing harm to others and refraining from using them instrumentally for personal gain, as well as managing limited social resources. Human desires for power and for social and financial prestige often lead individuals to exploit one another for personal interests, infringe on each other's rights, and prevent them from having simultaneous access to limited social resources. This rule plays a role in the legal system due to its social and legal consequences, not just its ethical implications. It can be argued that it serves as a suitable tool for recognizing fundamental human rights and needs and extending them to others, aiding the legal system in this regard. The element of imagination and consistency of this rule, consisting of two principles―conscience (the alignment between behavior and an individual's desire for correct behavior) and impartiality (similar evaluation in similar cases, regardless of the individuals
involved)―lead to the use of shared human data and information or customary understanding, its application to others, and, ultimately, the alignment of natural human rights with the social environment, making them enforceable in positive law. As a general legal principle, it possesses an ideal and ethical nature, unbound by specific borders, geography, culture, or religion. Due to its element of consistency, it enjoys rational acceptance. With its imaginative element, it is abstract and concerned with the realm of existence rather than proof. The application of this rule within the legal system serves as the basis for existence and justification of legal rules and judicial decisions. Of course, the role of the Golden Rule as a legal principle in the legislative phase differs from its role in the judicial phase. 1. In the legislative phase, it is considered an independent source of the legal system, and the validity of rules is measured by it. At this stage, the legislator seeks to discover the customary understanding and direct perception common to human beings for legislation, which is directly obtained through the application of the Golden Rule. 2. In the judicial phase, it is used as a complementary source to interpret the law narrowly or broadly and suppliment it in cases of silence, deficiency, ambiguity, and contradiction. 5. Conclusion Applying the Golden Rule in the legal system ensures its rationality and efficiency because the Golden Rule requires legislator and judge to act consistently toward citizens in similar situations, and it reduces concerns about public compliance with laws and judgments. Adhering to the Golden Rule during the enactment of laws and judicial decisions convinces people to comply with the relevant law or judgment. This is not necessarily due to the presence of punishment, but rather to an internal motivation arising from improved attitudes and perspectives. In fact, applying the Golden Rule in the legal system contributes to its socialization. The concept of socialization from an anthropological perspective is related to the Golden Rule because, according to the Golden Rule, humans are considered beings with common ways of thinking, feeling, valuing, and shared behavioral norms. In a word, applying the Golden Rule as a general principle in the legal system brings the two concepts of metaphysics and reality closer together. Thus, applying the golden rule in the form of the "principle of individualization of punishment" in criminal law, causes the legislator, trial judge, and execution judge, when determining and executing punishment, to put themselves in the place of the offender, with the same personal and social limitations, and to impose and execute punishment more appropriately and realistically, thereby better achieving the goals of criminal law of preventing recidivism, ensuring proportionality between crime and punishment, and administering real justice. Similarly, applying this rule in the form of the "principle of reasonableness" in modern contract law suppliments and clarifies the contract, invalidates unfair and unrealistic terms, and brings it closer to the actual circumstances of the parties. Applying this rule in the form of the "reasonable person" standard in fault-based civil liability law causes this standard to change from an objective and unrealistic form based solely on consideration of the harmful conduct to one focused on the decision-making process of the person causing the harm when there is a conflict and lack of coordination between that person’s plans and priorities and those of the victim, thereby turning it into a more realistic and efficient standard for determining fault-based civil liability.