Private Law
Iraj Babaei; Shobeir Azadbakht
Abstract
The observance of individuals' contractual rights by other members of society is a desirable goal that is sometimes not achieved. After a harmful act is committed and loss is inflicted upon the right-holder, they are placed in an unfavorable situation. This unpleasant situation causes the obligor to ...
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The observance of individuals' contractual rights by other members of society is a desirable goal that is sometimes not achieved. After a harmful act is committed and loss is inflicted upon the right-holder, they are placed in an unfavorable situation. This unpleasant situation causes the obligor to resort to the contractual civil liability system to assert his rights and claim damages.
The contractual liability system employs various mechanisms to safeguard the rights of claimants. Damages methods are categorized into two groups, Compensatory and non-compensatory damages, based on their underlying objectives. In determining the amount payable for compensatory damages, the primary focus is on compensating the aggrieved party for incurred losses. In contrast, non-compensatory damages center on factors such as the wrongdoer’s bad faith or stripping the violator of unlawfully obtained benefits.
However, it is often stated in civil liability law that the customary and normal method of paying damages in contractual civil liability is to pay “Compensatory damages”, i.e., expectation damages and reliance damages. However, the insistence on the traditional method of paying damages should not neglect the civil liability system from other methods. In this regard, the common law legal system has moved towards accepting other types of damages with the aim of depriving the infringer of benefits. Among these damages, which is the subject of this article, is the disgorgement damages.
Disgorgement damages - a form of non-compensatory damages and, in essence, a gain-based remedy - has drawn the attention of Iranian legal scholars due to its common law origins. In this context, several key questions arise concerning its justification within Iranian law:
How can the concept and position of this legal remedy be analyzed among other damages?
What are the challenges and applications of this mechanism within the civil liability system?
In addition, the fundamental question of why the traditional methods of paying damages and reaching a new and novel path of denying benefits resulting from infringement of rights still remain. In fact, the main question is why the American and English legal systems, along with the traditional methods of paying damages, have focused their attention and focus on denying benefits resulting from infringement of rights? What are the inadequacies and shortcomings of traditional methods that have forced common law scholars to break their habit and struggle to find the scope of application of disgorgement damages? Above this, what exactly are the functions and goals that can be achieved by the new institution of disgorgement damages? These questions seem natural to lawyers of a system based on written law, such as Iranian law, because if an unjustifiable answer is reached, there will be no need to examine this institution in our country's legal system.
This study adopts an analytical-descriptive approach with a comparative perspective on the legal systems of the United States and England to address these questions. Ultimately, it appears that despite existing challenges, disgorgement of profits can serve as an exceptional and highly effective remedy in contractual liability.
In other words, given the long history and reliance of the civil liability system on compensatory damages, the introduction and consolidation of the aforementioned remedies will naturally face several challenges. In this type of damage, instead of paying attention to the amount of damage caused to the right holder, the amount of benefits gained by him is considered. In fact, the acceptance of this institution causes the view of the compensation system in compulsory and contractual civil liability to shift from focusing solely on the injured party and, in this way, to also address the situation of the violator.
If the main goal of compensatory damages is to create the maximum indifference between the situation before and after the injured party (after the occurrence of the harmful event), the goal of disgorgement damages is to create this indifference in the situation of the violator. Naturally, this approach to damages requires justification.
In fact, Challenges such as the uncertainty of commercial contracts, the principle of full compensation, the obligation to deal with the damage, the adequacy of compensatory damages, and the lack of attention to the skill and effort of the infringer reinforce the tendency to reject and recognize the aforementioned institution.
However, it seems that, first, all the challenges mentioned are weak in terms of their basis and cannot seriously challenge the acceptance of disgorgement damages; second, disgorgement damages has undeniable benefits (such as helping to achieve the goals of civil liability, etc.); and third, disgorgement damages does not seek to replace and be placed in the presence of other damages, but rather the main purpose of this remedy is to fill the gaps in the traditional and customary methods of paying damages.
More precisely, the disgorgement damages will play a certain role during the other existing remedies and in cases of their inefficiency. The result is that, at least from a theoretical perspective, there is no significant obstacle to the entry and recognition of disclaimers of interest in the civil liability system.
Private Law
Badie Fathi
Abstract
The division of judicial bodies and the establishment of monetary thresholds as a criterion for determining value-based jurisdiction (ratione valoris) are fundamental tools of judicial policy aimed at enhancing the efficiency of the justice system and ensuring the optimal allocation of resources. This ...
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The division of judicial bodies and the establishment of monetary thresholds as a criterion for determining value-based jurisdiction (ratione valoris) are fundamental tools of judicial policy aimed at enhancing the efficiency of the justice system and ensuring the optimal allocation of resources. This model, with deep roots in both Romano-Germanic (Civil Law) and Common Law systems, is founded on the principle of proportionality between the complexity of a dispute and the adjudicating body. It plays a decisive role in segregating minor from major claims, facilitating specialized case allocation, and enabling higher courts to focus on more significant disputes—all in service of the meta-principle of the proper administration of justice. Unification Judgment No. 865, issued by the Iranian Supreme Court on July 22, 2025 (31 Tir 1404), by affirming the plaintiff’s ability to value a claim in a manner that influences value-based jurisdiction, has ignited significant legal debate regarding the foundational objectives of this jurisdictional framework and the proper effect of claim valuation, raising extensive theoretical and practical implications. This article examines these dimensions using an analytical-critical methodology and a historical-comparative approach. Legislative history and comparative analysis reveal that Iranian law has traditionally relied on the “real value of the claim” to determine jurisdiction, seldom permitting a plaintiff’s unilateral valuation to be the sole basis. This aligns with international practice: in France, since the judicial organization law of 1790, the jurisdiction of the Peace Court (juge de paix) has been predicated on the real value of the dispute. Similarly, in the United States, the “amount in controversy” requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction is subject to a good-faith assessment and can be challenged and scrutinized by the court. This research concludes that Unification Judgment No. 865 is inconsistent with the underlying philosophy of value-based jurisdiction. It advocates for legislative reform to: (1) explicitly codify the “real value of the claim” as the controlling standard; (2) establish a clear procedural mechanism, through judicial precedent, for challenging claim valuations; and (3) revise the jurisdictional limits of lower courts based on their specialized capacity.
The Iranian Supreme Court’s Unification Judgment No. 865 has instigated extensive legal controversies by establishing that a plaintiff’s unilateral valuation of the claim (taqvim-e khasteh) directly determines subject-matter jurisdiction (ratione valoris) between the Peace Court (a court of limited jurisdiction) and higher civil tribunals, namely the General Civil and Family Courts. An examination of Iran’s legislative history since the adoption of its first code of civil procedure in 1911 (see, e.g., Law on the Principles of Court Organization and Officials’ Employment of 1911), combined with a comparative analysis of the French and American legal systems, reveals that the foundational philosophy of pecuniary jurisdiction has consistently been predicated on the objective or real value of a claim, rather than the plaintiff’s subjective assessment.
In France, a principle established since the Judiciary Act of 1790 and upheld in its modern Code of Judicial Organization (Code de l’organisation judiciaire), and similarly in the United States through the “Amount in Controversy” doctrine, the valuation of a claim is subject to judicial scrutiny and may be challenged and amended (see, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 1938). From the author’s perspective, Unification Judgment No. 865 is therefore not only incongruous with fundamental principles of procedural justice and the teleological purpose of subject-matter jurisdiction, but it also portends deleterious organizational, social, and legal ramifications.
This judgment effectively neutralizes the function of pecuniary jurisdiction as a critical managerial and organizational instrument for the efficient allocation of judicial resources, the docketing and segregation of minor versus major disputes, and the cultivation of judicial specialization and expertise. The establishment of jurisdictional monetary thresholds ought to be calibrated to the “institutional capacity” of each judicial tier, thereby ensuring that legally complex cases, irrespective of their nominal monetary value, are adjudicated by tribunals possessing the requisite competence and specialized knowledge.
Furthermore, the ruling contravenes several core legal principles, including the right of access to a competent and appropriate judicial forum, the principles of good governance, proportionality in civil procedure, and the duty of candor in litigation. In essence, by devolving the determination of jurisdiction to the arbitrary volition of an individual litigant, Judgment No. 865 erodes the juridico-administrative order of the judiciary. To preserve procedural efficiency and safeguard public trust, its legislative reversal or amendment is an exigent necessity. In the interim, judicial practice could mitigate the judgment’s impact by permitting jurisdictional challenges to the plaintiff’s stated value of the claim.
This research thus concludes that Unification Judgment No. 865 is fundamentally at variance with the philosophy and doctrinal underpinnings of subject-matter jurisdiction (ratione valoris). It is imperative that legislative reform be undertaken to: (1) explicitly codify the “real value” of the claim as the objective jurisdictional criterion, (2) institute a procedural mechanism for challenging a plaintiff’s valuation, and (3) recalibrate the jurisdictional mandates of lower courts in alignment with their specialized capacities.
Private Law
Abbas Asadi
Abstract
One of the issues facing the Iranian legal system today is the unpredictability of judicial judgments; as in some cases, they are so unpredictable that individuals, no matter how familiar with legal issues, cannot predict the court's decisions.
The Predictability of judicial decisions in the Iranian ...
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One of the issues facing the Iranian legal system today is the unpredictability of judicial judgments; as in some cases, they are so unpredictable that individuals, no matter how familiar with legal issues, cannot predict the court's decisions.
The Predictability of judicial decisions in the Iranian legal system is both theoretically and practically essential, and unpredictability has harmful individual, social, economic, and legal effects. As is said today, predictability of law is one of the fundamental values of democracy and the Law-abiding government, and law should be as understandable, transparent, and predictable as possible. In other words, the legal system should be predictable and act in harmony in all similar cases.
Based on these necessities, the judiciary in the judicial security document approved on 2020/10/14 and also the judicial transformation document approved on 2020/12/26 have emphasized on predictability of results of the legal system (judicial judgments). As stated in Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Judicial Security Document: “The principle of legitimate trust is the possibility of predicting the results of the legal system, which can ultimately attract the trust of citizens in the judicial system.” Also, the Document on the Transformation and Excellence of the Judiciary, approved on 2024/3/26, lists creating transparency in the process of hearing and issuing judicial decisions as one of the transformational programs of that authority.
From a practical point of view, it is not possible to achieve judicial justice without the predictability of judicial judgments. Justice has been interpreted in many ways, including in the form of the Aristotelian principle: "Treat like cases alike." Waldron says: "It is unfair to apply the law as a lottery, with the result that the application of the law varies depending on the luck of the individual. Individuals should not rely on their good fortune or fear their bad fortune in the law that applies to their claims."
The unpredictability of judicial decisions in the legal system has harmful individual, social, economic and legal effects. The unpredictability of judicial decisions from an individual perspective causes uncertainty in the regulation of legal relations and disrupts freedom of decision-making, as a person who intends to take a legal action is unable to predict the fate of their action. Socially, the Unpredictability of judicial decisions causes disorder, chaos, and unrest, and economically, it causes a decrease in domestic and foreign investment. From a legal perspective, if different decisions are issued in cases with the same subject, it will ultimately lead to a decrease in trust in the judicial system, as it is being accused, delaying proceedings and reducing judicial efficiency. From the perspective of the relationship between law and ethics, the predictability of judicial decisions should be considered one of the ethical principles of law.
In this article, using a descriptive-analytical method, it was concluded that the lack of legal certainty, legal transparency, legal coherence, and legal stability are the most important reasons for the unpredictability of judgments in the Iranian legal system. The vagueness of laws, the influence of non-legal factors in the issuance of judicial decisions, the granting of unregulated discretion to judges in some cases, as well as the dispersion, duality of sources and bases for lawmaking, and the frequent changes to some laws have caused legal transparency, certainty, coherence, and stability to diminish. In principle, the unpredictability of judicial decisions can be eliminated by providing solutions that lead to increased transparency, certainty, coherence, and legal stability.
Formalism, both at the legislative and judicial interpretation stages, also increases the predictability of judgments. The more formalistic a legal system is, the more predictable it is. In fact, following the teachings of the formalist school increases the unpredictability of judicial decisions. The formalist school introduces law as a complete, comprehensive, regular, and always understandable work, and in its justification, it cites reasons such as order and coherence, preventing chaos and the dictatorship of judges, and turning the trial into an arbitrary process. As such, certainty, predictability, integrity, and uniformity of law are among the advantages listed for the formalist school. Also, given that most rules related to contract law are supplementary, the parties to the contract can use clarifying contractual terms in cases of deficiency, insufficiency, conflict, or silence of the laws to make decisions regarding the aforementioned matters in their contractual relationship and thus reduce the unpredictability of judicial judgments in their legal relationship.
Private Law
Abbas Mirshekari; Jamshid Zargari
Abstract
This research aims to provide a comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and structured analysis of the emerging concept of the "right not to know" at the intersection of law, medicine, and philosophy. Unlike previous studies that have often addressed the legal, medical, or philosophical aspects in a fragmented ...
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This research aims to provide a comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and structured analysis of the emerging concept of the "right not to know" at the intersection of law, medicine, and philosophy. Unlike previous studies that have often addressed the legal, medical, or philosophical aspects in a fragmented or one-dimensional manner, this study adopts an integrative approach to delineate the interactions and overlaps between these dimensions. The primary question is whether the "right not to know" has achieved an established position in international human rights frameworks and in Iran's national legal system. This objective is rooted in Iranian literary and cultural traditions that praise knowledge as a light liberating from ignorance, yet subtly acknowledge the "right not to know" in cases causing distress. The study also examines the conflict between awareness and the preservation of privacy, mental health, and human dignity in the context of advancements in medical technologies like genomics and artificial intelligence. The ultimate goal is to outline a precise, multifaceted perspective on the foundations, legal status, proponents' and opponents' views, and Iran's position to lay the groundwork for future policy-making.
The study employs descriptive-analytical methods to explain concepts and theoretical frameworks, and historical methods to examine the evolution of legal developments related to the "right not to know". Research sources include books, scholarly articles, international legal documents (such as the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 1997, the Oviedo Convention 1997, and the Council of Europe Recommendation 1992), opinions of prominent philosophers, and analysis of Iran's national laws and regulations (such as the Law on Publication and Free Access to Information 2009, the National Data and Information Management Law 2022, the Civil Registration Law, and the Patient Rights Charter). These sources have been examined using qualitative methods, including content analysis, comparative studies, and critical analysis. The article is structured around four main axes: 1) Foundations of the right not to know (focusing on autonomy and self-determination), 2) Status of recognizing the right not to know in international documents, 3) Views of proponents and opponents across four axes (emerging social needs, natural rights theory, protection of collective interests, and implementation challenges), and 4) Status in Iran's legal system. This interdisciplinary methodology allows for the integration of legal, philosophical, psychological, and medical perspectives to deliver a deep and layered analysis.
The findings reveal that the foundations of the "right not to know" are rooted in the principles of autonomy (as the right to freely decide about one's life) and self-determination (as individual sovereignty over fate), which are embodied in human rights documents. At the international level, this concept is recognized in documents like the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome (Article 5, Paragraph 3) and the Oviedo Convention (Article 10, Paragraph 2) as a respected individual preference, but not as a binding legal right, and it is weakened by exceptions such as public health protection. Proponents' views emphasize emerging social needs (protecting mental health from genetic information), justification based on natural rights (complementary to the right to know), utilitarianism (enhancing collective well-being), and feasibility of implementation, while opponents see it as a threat to informed consent, collective interests (e.g., preventing contagious diseases), and challenging in execution (due to the hereditary nature of information). In Iran's legal system, this right is not explicitly or implicitly recognized, with the governing principle being the "right to know"; laws like the Law on Publication and Free Access to Information emphasize transparency, but provisions like Article 16 (refraining from disclosure in cases harming health) may implicitly support it, though focusing more on privacy than autonomy. The Patient Rights Charter (Clause 1-2-2) refers to respecting patient refusal, but lacks legal force and is ambiguous with terms like "serious risk".
The innovation of this research lies in its integrative interdisciplinary approach, which for the first time examines the interaction between Iranian literary-cultural aspects, philosophical (autonomy and self-determination), legal (international and national documents), and medical (genetic advancements) dimensions in the concept of the "right not to know". Its added value is the critical analysis of Iran's status, demonstrating how Iranian cultural traditions (distinguishing beneficial knowledge from distressing ignorance) could serve as a basis for establishing this right, yet the current legal system lacks it. By highlighting implementation challenges and theoretical debates, the study suggests to policymakers the need for explicit laws to balance individual freedom and public interests. Its practical value is in recommendations such as developing empathetic information protocols, allowing choice of timing for receiving information, providing comprehensive psychological support, and combating discrimination, which can improve patients' quality of life and strengthen trust in the healthcare system. This research enriches Iran's legal literature and provides a foundation for future bioethics studies.
Ultimately, the "right not to know" as an emerging concept at the crossroads of law and medicine is an effort to uphold human rights principles amid the influx of medical information, particularly in the era of genetic and diagnostic technologies. This concept, emphasizing an individual's informed refusal of medical information, serves not only as a shield against psychological and social harms but also as a reflection of respect for human dignity and individual value diversity. The examination of its theoretical foundations reveals its roots in the core principles of autonomy and self-determination, which hold established positions in international human rights documents and contemporary legal systems. However, the right not to know remains, in international legal arenas—such as the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and the Oviedo Convention—more as an individual preference than an explicit legal right, lacking the necessary firmness for institutionalization due to inconsistencies and numerous exceptions. At the theoretical level, debates between proponents and opponents revolve around axes such as emerging social needs, justifiability under natural rights theory, utilitarian considerations, and implementation challenges. Proponents view it as a tool for mental health protection and discrimination prevention, while opponents consider it a potential threat to informed consent and collective interests. In Iran's legal system, the concept is not explicitly or implicitly recognized, with the dominant principle in the medical system being the patient's "right to know", obligating physicians to provide complete and necessary information. Although certain clauses in the Patient Rights Charter indirectly support choices for not knowing medical information, the lack of binding legal support and ambiguity in implementation criteria render reliance on this right impractical. To recognize the right not to know as a legal right, there is a need for clear and precise legal text that defines its boundaries centered on patient autonomy and will, rather than a paternalistic physician's perspective, as physician decision-making without considering patient wishes conflicts with self-determination and can undermine trust in the treatment system. Until such recognition, strategies like developing empathetic information guidelines emphasizing communication skills such as active listening, simple language, and gradual information delivery; allowing patients to choose appropriate timing for receiving information; providing comprehensive support including psychological counseling, support groups, and reliable informational resources; and combating discrimination and social stigma through anti-discrimination laws and awareness campaigns can promote a patient-centered approach that respects autonomy, facilitates informed participation in health decisions, and leads to improved mental health and quality of life for patients.
Private Law
Mahdi Hamze Howeyda
Abstract
The demand for security for damages resulting from filing a false lawsuit is an institution to counter baseless and harassing lawsuits, which has also been considered by the Iranian legislator. Regardless of the concept of a false lawsuit and the conditions for citing it, the present study has attempted ...
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The demand for security for damages resulting from filing a false lawsuit is an institution to counter baseless and harassing lawsuits, which has also been considered by the Iranian legislator. Regardless of the concept of a false lawsuit and the conditions for citing it, the present study has attempted to examine, using a descriptive-analytical method, the time to object to the falseness of the lawsuit and the request for security for it. Although at first glance at the text of Article 109 of the Civil Procedure Code, there is no restriction on time and for this reason, many courts do not consider the objection to a false lawsuit to be subject to time, the essence of the article and the guarantee of enforcement provided in it show that not only is this institution bound by time, but it also faces time constraints and must be invoked in the first stages of the proceedings.
The usual way to counter a false lawsuit, in addition to compensating for the damages incurred, is to impose a heavy fine or, in some cases, to determine a criminal penalty. However, the guarantee of enforcement provided in the Iranian Civil Procedure Code has been something more than a claim for damages and fines from the very beginning. The defendant can refuse to respond to the plaintiff's lawsuit until he has secured and deposited his possible damages (stay of proceedings). The barrier created in Iranian procedural law against filing false claims is not seen in this way, even in the French Code of Civil Procedure. According to Article 32-1 of the French Code of Civil Procedure (amended in 2005), filing a groundless and frivolous lawsuit will be accompanied by a cash fine. Accordingly, the innovation of the Iranian legislator in dealing with groundless lawsuits is noteworthy.
The law has not provided a precise criterion for identifying the concept and examples of a frivolous lawsuit; the judge may determine a lawsuit to be frivolous based on the "type of lawsuit", "status of the lawsuit" and "other aspects" and collect compensation from the plaintiff for it.
Although examining the conditions for citing the frivolousness of a lawsuit and analyzing the concept of this institution are important in their own right, and lawyers have said and written about it, it is not the subject of this article. In this context, what is in the center of attention is the time of filing and citing the frivolousness of the lawsuit. When or for how long can the defendant object to the frivolousness of the plaintiff's lawsuit? Does this objection necessarily have to be made before the hearing? Is it possible to invoke the fact that the claim is frivolous even after hearing the substantive statements and defenses? Answering these questions is necessary because Article 109 of the Civil Procedure Code does not have an explicit provision regarding the time when the claim is frivolous. The aforementioned silence may create the impression and challenge that the objection to the fact that the claim is frivolous is not bound and limited to a specific time; the defendant can request compensation whenever he deems it necessary, and the court, if it finds the defendant's objection, can make a decision in this regard at any time and require the plaintiff to pay damages resulting from the filing of a frivolous claim. In fact, the text and appearance of the law are absolute in terms of time, and therefore, no limitation can be imposed on the defendant.
It goes without saying that any view regarding the time of claiming compensation will have important practical effects and significant consequences in the litigation process. However, regardless of the aforementioned effects and consequences, the reality is that until the nature of the claim for compensation is determined, it is not possible to correctly comment on the time of its filing. Accordingly, the approach and strategy of the present research is to find the time of claiming compensation based on the nature of this entity. The question of what a claim for compensation is and what its examples are goes back to the category of "concept". However, the issue of which category of procedural rules the defendant's claim for compensation for damages based on the claim being false falls into and what its position is in terms of procedure is a question of the nature of the objection to a false claim, and as a statement of the hypothesis, it can be answered as follows: the objection in question is actually a formal objection or, beyond that, it can be considered a substantive defense.
The exceptional nature of the objection to a false claim and attention to some practical problems reinforce the hypothesis that after passing the stage of reviewing the petition and entering into the dispute and its nature, the possibility of objecting to the false claim and requesting compensation will disappear.
Private Law
yaser khosrozade; Nejadali Almasi; hossin safaii; Mansoor Amini
Abstract
Today, one of the national and international problems in the field of sports competitions is the use of performance-enhancing substances by athletes. Doping leaves unwanted and harmful side effects on the athlete's body, which can be irreversible in some cases, and therefore causes irreparable damage ...
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Today, one of the national and international problems in the field of sports competitions is the use of performance-enhancing substances by athletes. Doping leaves unwanted and harmful side effects on the athlete's body, which can be irreversible in some cases, and therefore causes irreparable damage to the athlete's health. Doping is contrary to the highest goals of sport, which are to improve the health of the body and mind, and is contrary to the current regulations of sports organizations because it creates an unfair advantage in the sporting arena. Therefore, doping is prohibited for the basic physical, moral and legal reasons mentioned.
To combat this problem, several measures have been taken, the most important of which is the establishment of the principle of strict liability for athletes who commit doping. Today, the principle of strict liability for athletes who use performance-enhancing drugs has been universally accepted. In fact, the principle of strict liability is one of the most central anti-doping policies in sports.
According to the above principle, which is reflected in Article 2.1.1 of the World Anti-Doping Code, "It is the Athletes’ personal duty to ensure that no Prohibited Substance enters their bodies. Athletes are responsible for any Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers found to be present in their Samples. Accordingly, it is not necessary that intent, Fault, Negligence or knowing Use on the Athlete’s part be demonstrated in order to establish an anti-doping rule violation under Article 2.1."
The aforementioned principle has a wide scope, in such a way that its scope is wide in various aspects: subject matter, mentality, degree of impact, and method of intervention. From a subject matter perspective, the mere presence of performance-enhancing substances in an athlete's body does not lead to disqualification of the athlete, but rather eleven violations as described in the World Anti-Doping Code lead to disqualification. In terms of mentality, it is not only the intentional act that causes the violation, but even if an athlete has completely unintentionally, mistakenly, ingested banned substances into his body, he is subject to the aforementioned principle. In terms of the degree of effect, it does not matter whether the stimulants improve the athlete's performance or have no effect. In any case, the responsibility is fulfilled. Of course, exceptional cases, such as medical exemptions if it is done according to the regulations, will result in the exempting athlete being held liable.
In fact, even if the athlete's sample tested positive due to mislabeling or contamination of dietary supplements or vitamins, the prohibited substances were administered by the athlete's personal physician or sports nurse without the athlete's knowledge, as athletes are responsible for choosing their own medical personnel and must remind their medical personnel that they should not give them any prohibited substances, this does not justify liability. Also, tampering with an athlete's food and drink by their spouse, coach, or other people in the athlete's circle of companions has no effect, as athletes are responsible for what they consume and must be careful in choosing who has access to their food and drink. Therefore, these cases are only effective in reducing the penalty and not in determining whether an anti-doping rule violation has occurred.
Research into doping cases involving Iranian athletes also confirms that decisions in these cases were made similarly to those in foreign countries, and in no way was the athlete exempted from liability because she or he was unaware of the presence of prohibited substances in her body or provided medical documentation. Thus, it can be assumed that in sports legal practice, proving that prohibited substances entered the athlete's body by mistake, accident, or even therapeutic use does not in any way remove liability, as required by the principle of strict liability.
Exceptional cases, such as a therapeutic use exemption (TUE), may justify liability if carried out in accordance with the regulations. Athletes with a therapeutic use exemption are not subject to disqualification if their sample test results are positive for a prohibited substance that a medical professional has prescribed as a therapeutic drug. However, if an athlete does not have this TUE and her sample tests positive, providing medical documentation will have no effect on her condition. Thus, if an athlete uses a drug that is prohibited and is considered doping for a professional athlete, with only a medical prescription, he is guilty and will be disqualified. However, if he files a medical exemption application according to the prescribed conditions, he will not be disqualified.
