Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Ph.D. Student in Oil and Gas Law, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehrn, Iran

2 Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehrn, Iran

Abstract

Tax has undeniable role in Provision of the governments general budget and special position in financial regime of all oil and gas contracts. Host states always trying to provide presence and investment conditions of multinational enterprices in oil and gas industry for advancing their economic goals and collecting considerable Income tax. Although multinational enterprises are important actors in the international trade and one of the main factors of global economic growth, the destructive effects of some of their actions are not desireable. The structure of these companies is somehow that parent company controls and manages many subsidiary companies in various countries and advances its besiness goals in any way possible. This structure provides for these companies the possibility of tax avoidance via transfer pricing mechanism. In international oil and gas industry, a significant volume of transactions are between parent company and its subsidiary companies or between subsidiary companies of a parent company. Transfer pricing is a mechanism based on that goods. services, rights and property related to intellectual property, facilities and ... transfer from parent company to subsidiary or between subsidiaries of parent company at a price different from the usual market price. Indeed, the purpose of utilization of this mechanism is internalization of transactions and determining desired prices for the purpose of reducing taxable income and transfer of funds from geographic territory with a high income tax rate to another geographic territory with a low income tax rate. Host countries tax revenues affected by this action of multinational companies. Host countries with the aim of collecting maximum tax revenues determine financial regime of oil and gas contracts, whiles controlled transactions of multinational enterprises obstruct this goal. Transfer pricing violates competition law to the detriment of small companies. Although multinational enterprises with their structure internalize transactions, avoid tax payment and save financial resources resulting from it easily, but small companies do not have such a capability, can not avoide tax liabilities and invest financial resources resulting from it in other sectors. Oil and gas industry due to the need to huge investment and modern technologies is desprately depending on the presence of multinational companies, and a very high turnover of money increase  the motivation of those companies in the utilization of transfer pricing mechanism. Supply of required goods and services from affiliated companies at a price outside the normal market price and providing facilities with an interest rate higher or lower than the usual rate reduce tax income of host states and create many challenges to deal with this problem. Utilization of Arm's-Length principle is the most efficient tool to deal with transfer pricing. Based on this principle, if the price of goods and services exchanged in controlled transaction between two related companies differ from the usual price of those goods and services in uncontrolled transaction between two independent companies, tax experts ignore the price of controlled transaction and base the price of uncontrolled transaction for calculation of taxable income. This principle is universal and the method of its applying has been predicted in the tax laws and regulations of most countries. It is determined, By examining judicial precedent of countries, that tax experts, in calculating the due tax, ignore price announced by tax payer and by applying this principle determine taxable income. Despite all the advantages of the arm's-length principle, the challenges of its application cannot be overlooked. Comparative analysis is the basis of applying this principle and to do this, tax experts should find similar transaction related to same goods or services exchanged in a controlled transaction to compair price. In most cases, desired goods and services are unique and finding a similar transaction is impossible. This research, with the library method and examining judicial precedent, explains the transfer pricing of multinational companies with the special attention to the international oil and gas industries to find out that how these companies, by internalization of transactions and determination of their desired price, avoid paying tax to host governments. In the following, coping with transfer pricing by applying arm's-length principle, methods of applying this principle and Iran's legal status in dealing with this problem will be reviewed to find out that which legal instruments Iranian National Tax Administration has to deal with transfer pricing.
 

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Executive regulations of Law Permitting Registration of Branches or Representative Offices of Foreign Companies approved on March 31, 1998 by Board of Ministers [In Persian]
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