Private Law
Mostafa Elsan; Ali Aghayari; Leila Najafizadeh
Abstract
Family disputes are one of the most common disputes among Iranians both inside and outside the country. For individuals who are Iranian citizens living in other countries, access to the Iranian judiciary or access to mechanisms that allow them to receive legal services from Iran becomes important in ...
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Family disputes are one of the most common disputes among Iranians both inside and outside the country. For individuals who are Iranian citizens living in other countries, access to the Iranian judiciary or access to mechanisms that allow them to receive legal services from Iran becomes important in certain cases. Especially in the matter of divorce and separation, there is a possibility that one of the spouses may want to use the Iranian legal system for divorce. It is obvious that unnecessary strictness (in terms of formal and substantive laws and different procedures) can pave the way for deprivation of access to justice or to refer to other judicial systems.
In addition, the Family Protection Act provides for a non-judicial mechanism for divorces of Iranians abroad.The recognition and enforcement of divorce decisions issued by foreign courts is also an issue that Iranian courts deal with strictly, and it is necessary to examine the conditions and obstacles of such institutions. Finally, the article discusses the issue that using electronic litigation can facilitate Iranian citizens' access to the Iranian judiciary and enable judicial review of divorce cases.
The research method of this paper is descriptive. Given the theoretical nature of the research, the method of collecting field data will not be relevant, and due to the technical and legal approach of the research, the method of collecting data will be library-based; however, an attempt will be made to use judicial practice, court decisions, and related customs in analyzing the issues and topics.
Divorce and separation from each other are one of the problems of Iranians abroad, and most of Iran's missions abroad are involved in and related to such issues. In this regard, considering the legal gaps that exist, we see in practice that these shortcomings cause dissatisfaction among people when referring to the missions.
According to Articles 6 and 7 of the Civil Code and Articles 12 and 13 of the Constitution, divorce-related lawsuits are part of personal affairs and are generally subject to the law of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, when considering the lawsuits, the court must take into account the law of the spouses' country of origin in the divorce proceedings.
Divorce, due to its specific formalities, is in a way within the jurisdiction of domestic courts. In cases where a divorce decision is issued by foreign courts, this decision needs to be ratified by Iranian courts. Therefore, if the decision issued by the foreign court is against the substantive laws of Iran, such a decision will not be enforceable in Iran.
Of course, in Iran, the personal status of non-Muslims (such as Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians) is subject to the regulations of their own religion, based on the Civil Code and some specific laws. From Article 7 of the Civil Code: It follows that non-Muslim citizens are usually subject to the specific regulations of their own religion, except in cases where Iranian law provides otherwise. In addition, according to Article 13 of the Constitution, Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are officially recognized as religious minorities and follow their religious regulations in personal matters (marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.). At the same time, if the religious regulations of non-Muslims conflict with Iranian public law (such as public order or good morals), Iranian courts will refuse to ratify and, consequently, enforce such rulings.
In this paper, we will try to examine the jurisdiction of domestic courts over claims of Iranians abroad, the solutions provided by the legislator and the existing procedures in the representations of the Islamic Republic of Iran in dealing with divorce claims of couples abroad, and, given the increasing development of electronic litigation, we will present the necessary solutions for further progress of our country's legal system. This article examines the "Challenges and Issues of Divorce of Iranians Living Abroad with an Emphasis on Judicial Procedure" in four sections as follows: Divorce of Iranians Living Abroad: Substantive Regulations and Competent Court (Section One), Identification of Foreign Divorce Decisions in Iran (Section Two), Non-Judicial Mechanisms of Divorce of Iranians Living Abroad (Section Three), and Electronic Proceedings of Divorce of Iranians Living Abroad (Section Four), and finally, the conclusion and related suggestions are presented.
The approach of this paper is that although the Family Protection Act and the Consular Services Provision Circular (regarding the instructions for providing consular services at the embassy) have attempted to reduce or clarify the divorce procedures for Iranians abroad to some extent, this measure still faces numerous practical challenges, and the lengthy process, in some cases, discourages Iranian citizens from referring to Iranian law and courts.
Private Law
iraj babaei
Abstract
Introduction: Time as a Foundational Element in Contracts
Time is not merely a technicality but a core determinant of contractual utility in Iranian law. Contracts are formed with specific temporal expectations, and failure to perform obligations on time can nullify the purpose of the agreement for ...
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Introduction: Time as a Foundational Element in Contracts
Time is not merely a technicality but a core determinant of contractual utility in Iranian law. Contracts are formed with specific temporal expectations, and failure to perform obligations on time can nullify the purpose of the agreement for the obligee. For instance, a wedding caterer’s delayed delivery destroys the contract’s value, while late payment in a sale disrupts financial planning. Despite this, Iran’s prevailing legal doctrine—requiring court intervention for enforcement—ignores time sensitivity, causing procedural inefficiencies and substantive injustice. This article critiques the status quo and proposes reforms aligned with contractual autonomy and economic realism.
The Critical Role of Time in Contractual Utility
Economic and Functional Significance:Time directly impacts the value of reciprocal obligations. For example, a property lease’s utility hinges on timely possession, and delayed payment erodes the value of goods/services due to inflation or market shifts. The Civil Code implicitly recognizes this by voiding contracts with ambiguous performance timelines (Article 190).
Legal Consequences of Delay:Untimely performance disrupts the equilibrium of consideration. A buyer needing seasonal goods (e.g., winter heating systems) suffers irreparable loss if delivery is postponed, rendering enforcement futile.
Doctrinal Gap:While jurisprudence acknowledges time as a validity condition, it fails to integrate this into enforcement mechanisms, treating delay as a procedural breach rather than a substantive nullifier.
Critique of Prevailing Enforcement Mechanisms
Iran’s dominant legal framework imposes a rigid three-stage process:
Court referral for specific performance (Article 237).
Vicarious performance by a third party (Article 222).
Termination if performance is impossible (Article 239).
Flaws in this approach:
Temporal Inefficiency:Litigation can take months or years, during which the obligee’s losses compound (e.g., a construction delay halting business operations).
Ignoring Party Autonomy:The obligee cannot act unilaterally (e.g., hiring a substitute contractor immediately), violating the principle of mitigation of damages.
Economic Detriment:Market volatility magnifies losses. A currency devaluation during litigation may render a damage award inadequate.
Contradiction with Commercial Realities:Modern trade requires swift remedies, yet courts prioritize formalistic procedures over functional outcomes.
Proposed Framework: Obligee’s Autonomy and Conditional Rights
Reinterpreting the Civil Code supports a self-help paradigm for obligees:
Right to Immediate Termination:If time is a condition of performance, termination is automatic (e.g., undelivered wedding cakes). No court approval is needed.
Right to Vicarious Performance:The obligee may arrange substitute performance and claim costs as damages, provided:
The substitute is reasonably selected.
Costs are documented and necessary.
Right to Compel Performance + Damages:If performance retains utility post-deadline (e.g., late building materials for a non-urgent project), the obligee may seek specific performance with compensation for delay.
Safeguards Against Abuse:
The obligee’s actions must align with customary standards.
A court may review reasonableness retrospectively.
Reinterpreting Statutory Provisions
Article 237:“May refer to the court” implies discretion, not obligation. The obligee may bypass courts if urgency demands it.
Article 222:Court authorization for vicarious performance applies only when delay does not exacerbate losses. In urgent cases, self-help is justified.
Article 221:"Compensation for breach" refers, inter alia, to damages resulting from untimely performance or non-performance of the contract, irrespective of whether the contract is performed by the obligee or a third party. In such circumstances, the obligee may claim either the costs incurred in performing the contract or damages for the breach itself and non-performance.
Mitigation Principle:The obligee’s duty to minimize losses undergirds these rights, aligning with the reasonable act criteria and Shiite jurisprudence.
Comparative Perspectives
French Law:The 2016 reforms permit unilateral substitute performance without prior court approval (Article 1226, Civil Code), mirroring Iran’s proposed model.
Common Law:Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) restricts damages to foreseeable losses, but obligees may terminate or arrange substitutes if time is “of the essence.”
Conclusion: Toward a Functional Jurisprudence
According to the proposed doctrine, Iranian law meets the reasonable and efficient rules regarding the performance of contracts by:
Recognizing time as a substantive element of contracts.
Granting obligees autonomous enforcement rights.
Limiting courts to ex-post reasonableness reviews.This aligns with global standards, reduces litigation burdens, and upholds contractual justice. The Civil Code’s existing provisions, reinterpreted through party autonomy and mitigation principles, offer a path forward without legislative overhaul.
Private Law
mohamad hosein osta; morteza shahbazinia
Abstract
This research examines the legal nature of the contractual relationship between the owners of the Snapp ride-hailing digital platform and its driver-users (commonly referred to as "driver-partners"). The principal aim of this study is to analyze and determine the appropriate legal classification of the ...
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This research examines the legal nature of the contractual relationship between the owners of the Snapp ride-hailing digital platform and its driver-users (commonly referred to as "driver-partners"). The principal aim of this study is to analyze and determine the appropriate legal classification of the relationship between these two parties. Given the complexities inherent in such platform-based contracts, the nature of the agreement is often mischaracterized or ambiguously interpreted under traditional legal frameworks such as employment contracts, service contracts, agency agreements, or usufruct arrangements.The methodology employed in this study is descriptive-analytical. Initially, a representative contract between Snapp and its driver-partners was examined. Subsequently, the provisions of this contract were compared and aligned with various legal regulations, prevailing judicial decisions, and authoritative academic opinions in the field of contract and labor law. At each stage, the research sought to propose the most accurate and contextually appropriate legal characterization of the contractual relationship in question.According to the terms and conditions laid out in the contractual agreement, drivers are classified as independent service providers. They possess autonomy in determining their working hours and bear full responsibility for their own operational expenses, including fuel costs, vehicle maintenance, and repairs. Moreover, driver-partners are directly accountable for the quality of service they render to passengers. These features significantly distance the relationship from that of a traditional employer-employee contract, where the employer typically exerts managerial control over hours, tools, and performance outcomes.Conversely, Snapp’s role is predominantly that of a digital intermediary and facilitator. The company provides the technological infrastructure for the ride-hailing service, processes ride requests via algorithmic matching, manages financial transactions between passengers and drivers, and deducts a predetermined commission from each completed trip. Importantly, Snapp does not exercise direct supervisory authority over drivers, nor does it dictate their schedules or enforce disciplinary measures typical of an employment relationship. A focal point of this research is the examination of existing judicial precedents concerning the legal status of such platform-mediated contractual relationships. Courts have frequently emphasized the absence of direct supervision and the complementary economic subordination of drivers, which collectively underscore the operational independence of these individuals. This judicial perspective supports the contention that the contractual affiliation between Snapp and its drivers is not predicated on hierarchical subordination or economic dependency, which are essential attributes of an employment contract. Furthermore, judicial bodies have consistently construed Snapp’s function as that of a technological enabler rather than a direct provider of transportation services. Such an interpretation reinforces the notion that Snapp does not assume the obligations typically borne by transportation companies, such as direct liability for service delivery or the provision of employment benefits. The findings of this study indicate that the contractual relationship in question cannot be squarely placed within any singular traditional legal category. While it shares certain features with employment, service, and agency contracts, it does not fully conform to the defining characteristics of any of these. Likewise, it cannot be adequately explained through the legal constructs of partnership or usufruct. Rather, it appears to represent a sui generis contractual relationship that blends elements of service provision with principles drawn from the sharing economy and platform capitalism. This unique legal configuration emerges from the specific dynamics of internet-based platforms, where decentralized service provision, algorithmic management, and peer-to-peer interaction redefine the contours of traditional contractual obligations. The relationship between Snapp and its driver-partners exemplifies this shift, as it is predicated not on hierarchical command structures but on flexible, demand-driven cooperation facilitated through digital infrastructure. In conclusion, this research posits that the legal relationship between ride-hailing platforms and their driver-users constitutes a novel form of contractual arrangement. It reflects the evolving nature of work and service provision in the digital era—where contractual autonomy, technological intermediation, and decentralized control challenge the adequacy of conventional legal taxonomies. As such, there is a compelling need for legislative and doctrinal innovation to accommodate the particularities of platform-based work within the broader legal system. This includes the development of new legal frameworks or the adaptation of existing ones to ensure clarity, fairness, and protection for all parties engaged in the emerging gig economy.
Private Law
Zeinab Tari
Abstract
This study explores the legal and financial mechanisms used in the calculation and compensation of future damages in cases of personal injury and death, with a particular focus on the use of the Ogden Tables in the United Kingdom and their comparison with the Iranian legal system. The paper is divided ...
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This study explores the legal and financial mechanisms used in the calculation and compensation of future damages in cases of personal injury and death, with a particular focus on the use of the Ogden Tables in the United Kingdom and their comparison with the Iranian legal system. The paper is divided into two major parts: (1) lump-sum compensation using actuarial tools such as the Ogden Tables, and (2) periodic payments as an alternative to lump-sum awards. The research highlights the advantages, disadvantages, and legal framework governing each method and evaluates the adaptability of these mechanisms within the Iranian context.
Lump-Sum Compensation and the Ogden Tables
In the UK, accurate estimation of future losses in personal injury and fatal accident cases is often conducted using the Ogden Tables. These tables, first published in 1999 and later approved by the House of Lords in Wells v Wells, serve as a standardized tool for calculating the present value of future financial losses such as lost income, medical expenses, and care costs.
The Ogden Tables incorporate multiple factors to produce actuarially sound multipliers that convert anticipated annual losses into a single present-day value. These factors include:
Discount Rate: A key determinant that reflects the anticipated rate of return on invested compensation. A lower discount rate (e.g., -0.25%) leads to a higher multiplier and consequently a larger compensation amount.
Mortality and Life Expectancy: Derived from official statistics, this factor increases the multiplier for younger claimants due to longer expected benefit periods.
Timing of Payment: The choice between immediate and deferred compensation (e.g., beginning at retirement age) significantly affects the calculation.
Despite economic variables such as inflation not directly influencing the multipliers, adjustments to the discount rate by the government aim to indirectly account for economic trends.
Application of Probabilistic Adjustments (Ogden Tables A to D)
When future losses are subject to significant uncertainty, such as in cases of severe disability, the Ogden Tables A to D are used in conjunction with the primary tables. These adjustments factor in the likelihood of events such as premature death, unemployment, and partial or total inability to return to work.
For instance, in estimating future lost earnings, variables like the claimant’s age, gender, education, pre- and post-injury employment status, and residual earning capacity are analyzed. The process involves applying probabilistic reduction factors (from Tables A–D) to base multipliers (from the primary Ogden Tables).
An illustrative example in the paper details the case of a 35-year-old woman who suffered a disability. Using the tables, her pre-injury and post-injury earning capacities were assessed and compared, leading to a calculated future loss of income of £648,350.
Structured or Periodic Payments
Under the Damages Act 1996 and the Damages (Variation of Periodical Payments) Order 2005, UK courts are empowered—and in certain cases obliged—to order periodic payments instead of lump sums. This system allows for greater financial security and adaptability for the injured party, particularly in long-term or life-long injury cases.
Advantages of Periodic Payments
Lifetime Coverage: Unlike lump-sum payments, periodic payments provide ongoing financial support throughout the claimant’s life.
Tax Efficiency: While both methods are tax-exempt, periodic payments avoid investment-related tax liabilities.
Prevention of Mismanagement: Structured payments minimize the risk of misuse of funds by the claimant.
Inflation Adjustment: Payments can be indexed to inflation and rising care costs, unlike static lump sums.
Risk Mitigation: Claimants are shielded from investment and longevity risks.
Disadvantages and Limited Use
Despite the benefits, periodic payments are less frequently ordered due to several practical and institutional challenges:
Higher Funding Costs: Maintaining a secure payment stream can cost up to one-third more than a lump sum.
Complex Needs Assessment: Accurate forecasting of future medical and care needs is difficult.
Administrative Burden: Courts may be reluctant to manage ongoing financial arrangements.
Consequently, structured settlements are typically used only when both parties consent.
Periodic Payments in Iranian Law
While the Iranian legal system does not have a structured periodic payment scheme comparable to that in the UK, some analogous mechanisms exist:
a) Diyya (Blood Money)
Under Articles 488 and 490 of the Islamic Penal Code, courts may allow the payment of diyya in installments over one to three years, especially when the defendant lacks financial capacity for a lump sum. Although primarily a facilitation for the debtor, this provision functions similarly to periodic payments by accounting for inflation and cost of living.
b) Mastamari (Annuity)
Articles 3 and 5 of the Iranian Civil Liability Act empower courts to order annuity-style payments when future damages are uncertain. This approach is particularly suitable for compensating long-term income loss due to permanent disability. Courts may also index these annuities based on national minimum wage standards to preserve purchasing power.
c) Instalment Payment of Damages
Article 277 of the Civil Code permits courts to allow deferred payments in hardship cases. Though functionally similar to structured payments, it lacks the sophistication and flexibility of UK periodic payment orders.
Adaptability and Flexibility of Orders
In the UK, courts can issue “open judgments” allowing for future modification of periodic payments based on changing circumstances. This legal flexibility, embedded in the Damages Act 1996, permits courts to reassess compensation in response to medical or life changes.
In Iran, Article 5 of the Civil Liability Act enables the court to revise a judgment within two years if new facts (such as a need for additional surgery or a newly discovered injury) arise. Separate claims may also be filed for new losses that are materially distinct from the original adjudicated damages.
Conclusion
The paper concludes that while the UK system of damages—particularly the use of the Ogden Tables and structured settlements—offers a comprehensive and adaptive model for future loss compensation, elements of this model can be integrated into Iranian law through creative use of existing mechanisms such as annuities and judicial discretion. Legal reforms that move toward a more flexible, need-based system of periodic compensation could better align Iran’s civil liability framework with international best practices and enhance fairness for injury victims.
Private Law
Rahim Rostampour; Mohammad Bahmani; Mohammad Hossein Erfan manesh
Abstract
What sets civil procedure apart from other branches of law is its structured, coherent, and orderly nature. This procedural order is not merely a mechanism to facilitate substantive justice; rather, it embodies a distinct form of procedural justice. Within this framework, procedural objections ...
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What sets civil procedure apart from other branches of law is its structured, coherent, and orderly nature. This procedural order is not merely a mechanism to facilitate substantive justice; rather, it embodies a distinct form of procedural justice. Within this framework, procedural objections serve as essential instruments for preserving the integrity of the judicial process. Far from being mere technicalities, these objections reflect fundamental legal values, such as the consistency of judgments, judicial efficiency, legal certainty, and respect for procedural fairness.
Using a descriptive-analytical approach, this article explores the theoretical foundations, legal implications, and practical functions of procedural objections within the broader concept of procedural public order. Contrary to the misconception that objections are solely tools for delaying or terminating proceedings, the paper argues that they play a pivotal role in maintaining the legitimacy and coherence of judicial proceedings.
Procedural objections are divided into two primary categories: those that pertain to public procedural order and those related to private party interests. The former includes objections such as lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, lis pendens (pending claims), res judicata, expiration of statutory deadlines, lack of legal standing, legal capacity or representation issues, speculative or baseless claims, absence of legal cause, and claims with no legal effect. These are inherently tied to public interest and procedural order and, as such, must be considered by the court even in the absence of a party’s objection.
One of the most significant objections examined is res judicata. This doctrine, which prevents the re-litigation of finalized claims, serves the core objective of avoiding contradictory judgments and preserving the authority and credibility of court decisions. It is tightly interwoven with procedural public order and judicial finality. The article also analyzes Article 84 of Iran’s Code of Civil Procedure, which outlines various objections, and interprets them through the lens of public order theory.
Of particular interest is the objection of connected claims (امر مرتبط), addressed in Articles 84 and 103 of the Iranian Civil Procedure Code. This objection allows a court to halt proceedings when a materially related claim is pending before another court. It ensures that courts do not issue conflicting judgments and that related disputes are resolved in a unified and consistent manner. The court's duty to recognize this objection ex officio, regardless of whether the parties raise it, underscores its alignment with procedural public order.
In this context, the role of attorneys is also crucial. According to Article 103, lawyers and parties are required to inform the court of any related or pending claims in other proceedings. This obligation is not a mere formality—it represents an active contribution to the judicial system's aim of ensuring harmony and avoiding fragmentation of legal determinations.
Furthermore, the paper distinguishes between optional (dispositive) and mandatory (imperative) procedural rules. Optional rules, such as local jurisdiction, serve private interests and require party invocation to be effective. In contrast, mandatory rules, like subject-matter jurisdiction or res judicata, are of such importance to procedural integrity that courts must apply them sua sponte. This distinction marks a critical boundary between objections that courts are obligated to recognize and those that rely on party initiative.
From a comparative perspective, the article engages with French procedural law, highlighting analogous mechanisms such as litispendance and connexité. These concepts, alongside autorité de la chose jugée (res judicata), illustrate France’s shared emphasis on procedural coherence, judicial economy, and the protection of public order. French jurisprudence and statutory provisions similarly oblige judges to recognize certain objections without party request, affirming their public nature.
Moreover, the comparative analysis shows that while French courts have long developed a sophisticated doctrine distinguishing between procedural obstacles of public and private character, Iranian law—though inspired by civil law traditions—still needs further doctrinal refinement to achieve a similar level of clarity. This calls for deeper legislative and judicial engagement with the principles of procedural order.
The article further draws upon Iranian case law and judicial practice to support its claims, including notable decisions from Iran’s Supreme Court and lower tribunals. These judgments demonstrate a growing awareness of the need to uphold procedural order by treating certain objections as non-waivable and binding on the courts. For example, the Iranian judiciary increasingly acknowledges that public-order-based objections, if overlooked, can undermine not only the rights of litigants but the legitimacy of the system as a whole.
Ultimately, the study concludes that preserving procedural public order requires a conceptual reassessment of objections in civil procedure. Objections that are deeply tied to public interest—such as res judicata, lack of jurisdiction, and pendency of related proceedings—must not be treated as mere defenses but as structural safeguards of the judicial process. Their recognition and enforcement by courts, even without party invocation, is essential to ensuring consistency, legitimacy, and the rule of law in civil adjudication.
In sum, procedural objections should be viewed as more than reactive tools; they are proactive guarantees of institutional fairness, procedural coherence, and legal stability. This article advocates a jurisprudential shift toward recognizing objections as vital expressions of public legal order, thereby aligning Iranian civil procedure with comparative models and international standards of fair trial and procedural justice.
International Trading
Sahar Karimi; Parisa Sinambari
Abstract
Blockchain technology, with its decentralized, transparent, and tamper-resistant structure, has emerged as a transformative force in the digital economy. It has disrupted traditional models of intermediation and redefined the flow of transactions and information. While these developments offer efficiency ...
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Blockchain technology, with its decentralized, transparent, and tamper-resistant structure, has emerged as a transformative force in the digital economy. It has disrupted traditional models of intermediation and redefined the flow of transactions and information. While these developments offer efficiency gains and novel economic opportunities, they also raise significant legal challenges, particularly for competition law. The concept of abuse of dominance—long a core tenet in antitrust enforcement—faces new interpretive and enforcement difficulties in blockchain-based markets, where identifying actors, market boundaries, and dominance is fundamentally more complex.This article explores the feasibility and necessity of applying abuse of dominance rules to blockchain ecosystems by drawing on a comparative legal analysis of Iranian and EU competition frameworks. In doing so, it examines both doctrinal underpinnings and applied challenges, arguing that the traditional tools of competition law must be reconfigured, rather than abandoned, to address the unique dynamics of decentralized networks.The research begins with a conceptual overview of blockchain technology, highlighting its key features: decentralization, immutability, anonymity, transparency, and distributed governance. These features pose a significant departure from the centralized, vertically integrated firm structures upon which classical competition law has been built. The article distinguishes between public (permissionless) blockchains, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, and private or consortium blockchains, such as Hyperledger Fabric or R3 Corda, emphasizing that the degree of centralization materially impacts the legal analysis of market power and responsibility.The first core challenge lies in defining the legal subject. The absence of a central controller or a legally recognized entity complicates the application of competition rules, which traditionally focus on firms or undertakings. The article explores theories such as the “nature of the firm” and the “granularity theory” (Schrepel), which suggest that even in decentralized systems, power may be concentrated among a core group of actors—such as developers, validators, or miners—who effectively determine network rules and outcomes. These actors, collectively or individually, may be held accountable under competition law based on their functional role, rather than their formal legal status.Another fundamental issue is market definition. Traditional tests, such as the SSNIP (Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price) test, become inadequate in digital and blockchain markets, where many services are offered for free, monetized through data, or facilitated via tokenomics. In light of this, the article discusses alternative metrics—such as quality, user engagement, interoperability, and data control—as potential proxies for market delineation. Drawing from EU jurisprudence, the study suggests adopting a functionality-based market analysis, especially in multi-sided platforms and network-driven ecosystems.Within blockchain contexts, abuse of dominance can take novel forms or mimic classical types in new guises. The article categorizes abusive conduct into three classical forms: exclusionary abuse, exploitative abuse, and discriminatory abuse, and investigates their possible manifestations in blockchain environments. Exclusionary AbuseIn consortium blockchains, exclusion can occur via refusal to deal, either technically (e.g., denying access to APIs or nodes) or contractually (e.g., requiring proprietary tokens or access standards). Public blockchains are ostensibly open, but strategic manipulation by dominant actors (e.g., through validator collusion or fee structures) can effectively limit new entrants. The article draws parallels with EU case law (e.g., Microsoft, Google Shopping), which recognizes such structural barriers as abuse. Tying and BundlingTying behaviors can be encoded into smart contracts or platform design, whereby access to one blockchain service is conditioned upon use of a bundled proprietary tool or token. If such architecture limits consumer choice or deters competition in ancillary markets, it could be deemed abusive. This is particularly relevant in interoperable DeFi (Decentralized Finance) ecosystems, where gatekeeping may be hidden within protocol logic. Predatory Innovation and PricingAggressive technical upgrades that deliberately exclude interoperability with rival protocols may constitute “predatory innovation”, a concept now recognized in the EU and U.S. legal discourse. The article applies this to blockchain upgrades that intentionally disrupt rival applications. Likewise, pricing structures—such as gas fees or validator incentives—may be manipulated below cost (especially in private blockchains) to crowd out competitors, aligning with classical predatory pricing concerns. Exploitative PracticesIn networks with strong lock-in effects and switching costs, dominant blockchain platforms may impose unjustified fees, unfavorable conditions, or opaque governance practices on users. Exploitative pricing or data extraction—particularly when end-users have limited alternatives—raises significant concerns for user welfare and fairness. The article highlights the need for transparency and procedural fairness in blockchain governance, echoing the EU's emphasis on user-centric competition frameworks. Discriminatory ConductDiscrimination in transaction prioritization, access levels, or protocol features (e.g., granting lower fees to selected users or nodes) may distort competitive equality. This is exacerbated in permissioned systems where operator discretion is high. While public blockchains promote visibility, private networks may conceal or rationalize unequal treatment in non-transparent ways. Here, the article urges alignment with principles embedded in Article 102(c) TFEU.From a normative perspective, the article underscores the importance of updating Iranian competition law, particularly Chapter Nine of the Law on the Implementation of Principle 44, to better reflect digital realities. Unlike the EU—which has adopted the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and issued draft guidelines on Article 102 to address platform dominance—Iran’s legal regime remains conceptually and institutionally under-equipped. Among the proposed reforms are the recognition of data as a source of market power, the redefinition of dominance in algorithmic settings, and the establishment of a specialized digital competition authority.The paper concludes that blockchain is not beyond the reach of antitrust law. While decentralization creates analytical and evidentiary complexities, it does not eliminate the potential for harm or dominance. Rather, it calls for a paradigm shift: from entity-based liability to function-based scrutiny, from price-centric metrics to dynamic, network-aware indicators. Enforcement strategies must evolve to detect subtle forms of exclusion and exploitation hidden in protocol design, smart contracts, and governance layers.Policy RecommendationsDevelop context-sensitive definitions of relevant markets, especially for multi-sided and zero-price platforms.Revise dominance criteria to incorporate network effects, data control, and rule-making power.Modernize Iranian competition rules in line with EU developments, including the Digital Markets Act.Establish a specialized authority for digital market analysis.Enhance oversight of private and hybrid blockchains, particularly where rule-making is concentrated and opacity prevails.In summary, this research supports the applicability and necessity of competition rules in blockchain-based markets. As new structures of economic coordination emerge, legal frameworks must adapt to prevent the concentration of power and ensure fairness, innovation, and access in the digital age.
