1. Introduction
The designation of the Civil Registration Organization as the official authority for issuing certificates of inheritance, as stipulated in Paragraph (e) of Article 113 of the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan Act of the Islamic Republic of Iran, represents one of the most significant institutional reforms in recent legislative cycles. This measure, supported by the enactment of a detailed 23-article executive bylaw, was initially justified by the legislature as a step toward administrative efficiency, reducing judicial workload, and facilitating citizens’ access to inheritance-related documentation. However, the legal framework underpinning this reform faces considerable challenges. The present study seeks to identify and analyze these challenges while assessing whether the delegation of such authority to a non-judicial body is consistent with existing legal principles and statutory provisions.
2. Literature Review
Although the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan Act entered into force in 2024 and the executive bylaw of Paragraph (e) of Article 113 was adopted in 2025, legal scholarship has thus far made no serious attempt to examine the aforementioned questions and challenges. This is despite the fact that the nature of these legal ambiguities and procedural challenges is such that they will inevitably confront judicial practice sooner or later. Accordingly, the necessity of addressing and analyzing these issues is self-evident.
3. Research Methodology
Employing a descriptive–analytical research method, this paper examines the relevant legal sources, laws and regulations governing certificates of inheritance in Iran. The method involves a comparative reading of the Seventh Development Plan’s provisions against foundational laws—particularly the Act on Mandatory Official Registration of Immovable Properties Transactions—and the previous laws and regulations governing non-contentious matters, thereby seeking to identify an appropriate response to the aforementioned challenges.
4. Results and Discussion
The legal implication of Subsection (e) of Article 113 and Paragraph 2 of Article 11 of its implementing bylaw indicates the necessity of including wills in certificates of inheritance. However, this requirement currently applies only to official wills, while holographic and secret wills require judicial validation before being included. Where such a will concerns immovable property and is executed under “ordinary circumstances,” this arrangement appears inconsistent with Article 1 of the Act on the Compulsory Registration of Official Transactions Concerning Immovable Property, indicating that the legislature failed to adequately consider the registration regime.
Paragraph 3 of Article 11, by requiring the Civil Registration Organization to specify the authority competent to review objections and the manner in which the certificate becomes final, remedies a deficiency previously found in judicial practice. Nevertheless, unlike Note 3 to Article 339 of the Civil Procedure Code, it fails to provide that the Organization’s designation is non-binding.
The ten-day period prescribed by Subsection (e) of Article 113 and Article 12 for objecting to a certificate is also inconsistent with Articles 362 and 369 of the Law on Non-Contentious Matters, which imposed no time limit on objections to court-issued certificates. Expiry of this period may compel interested persons to establish kinship judicially before obtaining amendment of the certificate.
Furthermore, Subsection (e) of Article 113 and Articles 12 and 13 designate the Dispute Resolution Board of the Civil Registration
Organization, which lacks a judicial officer, as the authority competent to review objections, despite the legal expertise required to resolve complex inheritance issues. The use of the term “judgment” for the Board’s decision is also questionable, particularly since Article 4 of the Civil Registration Act characterizes its determinations as “decisions.”
The silence of Subsection (e) and Article 13 concerning the authority competent to hear objections to the Board’s decision, coupled with their reference only to a “competent” court, may create jurisdictional conflicts between general civil courts and Peace Courts. Likewise, the absence of any provision concerning appeal has enabled the implementing bylaw to exceed interpretation and enter the legislative sphere by declaring first-instance judgments final.
A teleological interpretation, consistent with the latest legislative intent, supports the conclusion that jurisdiction lies with the Peace Court and that its judgment may, within the limits of the Civil Procedure Code, be challenged through ordinary and extraordinary remedies, except cassation. This applies whether the matter reaches the Peace Court through an objection to the Board’s decision or directly through an objection to the Organization’s decision.


Finally, although Article 18 addresses the effect of final judicial judgments concerning kinship on certificates of inheritance, it fails to address the converse situation in which the certificate itself has preceded or resulted in a final judgment. Read with Articles 8 and 426 of the Civil Procedure Code, this omission creates uncertainty as to which judgment prevails. In such circumstances, Article 477 of the Criminal Procedure Code may provide the only mechanism for
depriving a certificate-related judgment, wholly or partially, of legal effect where it is manifestly contrary to Sharia.
5. Conclusion
The findings of this research demonstrate that a lack of adequate familiarity on the part of the authorities responsible for adopting the act the the afformentioned executive bylaw with the relevant legal principles and laws and regulations governing certificates of inheritence—such as the Act on Mandatory Official Registration of Immovable Properties Transactions—has resulted in significant conflicts among the applicable laws. Misapplication of legal terminology (e.g., referring to the decisions of the Civil Registration Organization’s Dispute Resolution Board as “rulings”) and the inappropriate conferral of jurisdiction on this non-judicial Board, together with the imposition of a time limit for filing objections, further illustrate these deficiencies. In addition, the silence of Paragraph (e) of the aforementioned Article 113 on numerous essential aspects has sometimes led the executive bylaw to exceed its explanatory function and encroach upon the legislature’s domain by extending the scope of the Act beyond its original intent. In certain instances, this legislative silence is repeated in the bylaw itself, leaving unresolved issues such as the identification of the competent court to hear objections against the Board’s decisions and the possibility of subsequent appeals to appellate and supreme courts.