Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
1 PhD Student in Private Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran.
2 Assistant Prof. Faculty of Law and Political Science, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
This article introduces a analytical framework for classifying judicial and quasi-judicial decisions. The framework is centered on the criterion of "the type and extent of the decision-maker's authority," leading to a fundamental dichotomy between "discretionary" and "legal" decisions. Employing a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative approach, the study demonstrates that the obligation to provide reasoning and the criteria for its sufficiency are not uniform across these two types and must be tailored to their inherent nature. The findings indicate that discretionary decisions are based on a merits-based assessment, and their reasoning must focus on justifying this assessment by relying on factual and expert evidence. In contrast, legal decisions are subdivided into two categories: decisions involving the "technical application of law," which require controlled interpretation and reference to statutes, and decisions with "specified legal grounds," which are executive in nature, requiring merely a citation of the relevant legal provision. A comparative study of the principle of proportionality in systems supports this classification and the necessity for differentiated reasoning standards. The application of this dual framework can provide a realistic criterion for higher judicial oversight and contribute to enhancing the quality of judicial reasoning and the realization of fair proceedings.
Keywords
- Judicial Decisions
- Judicial Discretion
- Legal Interpretation
- Sufficiency of Reasoning
- Legal Citation
- Comparative Study
- Iranian Legal System
Main Subjects
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