Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Assistant Professor of Public International Law, Law Department, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Kurdistan, Sanandaj, Iran.

Abstract

Argument is live of law, explaining the correct way of legal reasoning is of great importance in deducting legal judgment. Sometimes, it is practically useful to prove a proposition indirectly rather than directly. Ad Absurdum Argument is a special mode of indirect proof by contradiction that seeks to establish a contention by deriving an absurdity from its denial.
In legal theory, the ad absurdum argumentation is normally analyzed as a kind of logical reasoning. Reductio ad Absurdum is one of the main functions of reason in deducting various legal issues. According to historians, the origin of ad absurdum argumentation and its application in scientific controversies can be traced back to antiquity, i.e., the era of the Megarians and the Elias[1]. In fact, the use of argumentation ad absurdum as a valid form of reasoning comes from the ancient Greek mathematics and the expression "hê eis to adunaton apagôgê", meaning reduction to the impossible[2] or absurdity, and can be found in Aristotle. In the new logic, this argument is considered as a special form of reduction to the impossible. This is an indirect method of proof that requires the assumption of the contradiction of what one wants to prove (self-contradiction) and then deducing logical implications from this assumption that are inconsistent with each other.
In contemporary literature regarding legal reasoning, two different types of ad absurdum argument have been recognized: the strictly logical form which rise to the introduction of proof by contradiction and the pragmatic. An example of the first ad absurdum argument can be judicial argument based on which it is absurd to accept that someone may be in a state of intoxication without having actually imbibed alcohol. Although someone who has drunk alcohol does not necessarily become intoxicated, it is meaningless to say that a person who is in a state of intoxication has not imbibed alcohol, because it is impossible that the intoxication state is not caused by drinking alcohol. The pragmatic type of ad absurdum argumentation is based on demonstrating that a given stance or interpretation, although in logical terms imaginable, is for some reason undesirable or unacceptable. An example of pragmatic version of ad absurdum argument is where a tribunal finds that, in a specific procedural situation, it is absurd to demand that a copy of a submission be delivered to the person that sent it. Although delivery in this situation is of course logically and physically possible, based on the common-sense principle, interpreting the law in this way would be absurd.

Purposes and Research Question(s)

The aim of this article is to analysis the nature, basses and structure of ad absurdum argument which have been used in the declaratory reasons of the courts. For this purpose, the questions which raises are that, what is the position of ad absurdum in inferring various legal issues? If we recognize ad absurdum arguments in law as a technique to help lawyers to reach their purpose, in what ways can it correctly be deployed in legal reasoning? And to what extent has this form of legal argumentation been used in legal documents and jurisprudence? In order to answer these questions, in this article, first it has been tried to explain how to use reductio ad absurdum in legal reasoning. Second, a set of brief instructions have been formulated in order to help lawyers and judges for justifying their pleadings or the basis of their decisions in such arguments. The main point of this effort is to state the basic and fundamental rules of interpretation, which can be derived from the structure of the ad absurdum argument and its main assumptions. By explaining such rules of ad absurdum argumentation, one can understand the normative importance of ad absurdum argumentation, i.e, the requirements that stem from this argument and the conditions to which a person can rely on as a stable and sturdy basis for legal decisions.

Methodology

The article has been performed based on the descriptive and analytical research method. The necessary data has been collected by library method.

Conclusion

By following various opinions, it seems to be an inevitable conclusion that ad absurdum argument deals with interpretive and hermeneutic arguments that generally prevent logical errors and may be used only in specific cases. In addition, lawyers may use this form of reasoning to justify their decisions, because this argument enables them to avoid conflict between norms and conflict between results and consequences of applicability of these norms. The context in which reduction ad absurdum is used is a controversial argumentation regarding the proper interpretation of a legal document. The speaker analyzes his interpretation in the light of an alternative (second clause) which seems implausible. Therefore, the ad absurdum argument is always a comparative argument that has two core grounds, i.e., the traditional and ontological. The above analyzes lead us to the conclusion that the ontological basis of ad absurdum argument may replace the traditional ground based on the assumption of a rational legislator. This is primarily supported by the fact that the ground proposed have more internal consistency and provide similar benefits, such as the elimination of contradictions between norms and contradictions among their results. The ad absurdum argumentation grounds of universal rationality concept, allows us to use a more objective criterion to evaluate the level of absurdity than the traditional grounds based on personal rationality. Therefore, applying and controlling the ad absurdum argument is easier, and the risk of using discretionary power will be reduced as well.
The analysis above shows that there is an essential common ground between the ad absurdum argumentation and the assumption of the rational legislator. The principal basis of these two forms of argumentation can be found in the principle of reasonableness and rationality which intend to supply a normative standard for legal reasoning. The rational legislator and ad absurdum argumentation are both normative structures that require the interpreter to fix the meaning of a norm in a sense that is rational and reasonable. What is clear is that the interpreter is responsible for the rationality of the law and not the rational legislator. In fact, an interpreter (a judge or lawyer) cannot determine what is reasonable without determining what is absurd, for these predicates are correlatives in the sense that whenever one is present, the other will be absent.

Keywords

 
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